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This research scrutinizes the social policies developed in Brazil between 1988 and 2001 
with the goal of examining the political process that combined the universalization of 
social rights and the development of social policies targeting the poor and, as a result, 
culminated in the first federal cash transfer program in Brazilian history. With this 
specific goal in mind, to undergo an historical study on the genesis of cash-transfer 
programs in Brazil, the focus of this research is to trace the origins of the convergence 
point, when the fight against poverty in Brazil aligned universal social rights jointly 
with a federal cash transfer program (Bolsa Escola). Since this research is underpinned 
by the successful results of cash-transfer programs in Brazil, it aims to discover what 
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I – Introduction 
Perhaps the most striking feature of Brazilian society is its extensive levels of 
poverty and inequality. It is inconceivable to live in Brazil and not be faced with a 
scenario where the utmost luxury coexists with extreme poverty. Any scholar that 
dedicates an academic career to learn and study about Brazil becomes versed in the 
robust economic development that the nation experienced through its modern history. 
Notwithstanding, such development was not accompanied by an overall socio-economic 
improvement of the Brazilian population.1 The high levels of intergenerational poverty 
indicate that if you are born in a poor Brazilian household it is very likely that you will 
die in the lowest stratum of Brazilian society.2 
Although the acute income gap has been a characteristic of Brazilian society 
since its colonial times, more recently the country has made the fight against poverty a 
governmental problem. The Constitution of 1988 is considered a milestone in the social 
history of Brazil. For the first time the country granted primary education and medical 
aid as universal rights that ought to be guaranteed by the government to every Brazilian 
citizen.3 In order to ensure that these basic rights of education and health care would not 
                                                          
1 Marshall C Eakin, Brazil: the Once and Future Country. (St. Martins Griffin, 1998), 202.  
Marshall Eakin illustrates how, in the Brazilian case, high economic growth did not translate to better 
widespread living conditions “From the 1930s to 1980s, Brazil experienced something of an industrial 
revolution, becoming the tenth largest economy in the world and the most industrialized nation in the 




2 For a detailed study on the dynamics of intergenerational poverty in Brazil see  
Dorte Verner and Erik Alda. “Youth at Risk, Social Exclusion, and Intergenerational Poverty Dynamics: 
A New Survey Instrument with Application to Brazil.” Policy Research Working Papers (June 2004): 1-
46.  
 
3 Federative Republic of Brazil Constitution, 1988. Art. 212  “Education, health, food, work, housing, 
leisure, security, social security, protection of motherhood and childhood, and assistance to the destitute 




simply be a written agreement, with no serious repercussions for politicians that opted 
to ignore it, government authorities after the 1988 Constitution no longer had absolute 
authority over the allocation of resources in the Federal budget. Article 212 of the 
Brazilian Constitution established that spending on healthcare could not be inferior to 
15% of the Net Tax Revenue while article 198 set 18% as the minimum to be invested 
in education.4 
1.1 Combining Universalism and Targeting the Poor 
Albeit the Constitution of 1988 represented a massive social advancement, it 
was not sufficient to solve the biggest social problem in the country – its enormous poor 
population and severe economic inequality. As long as the poor had meager access to 
income, they could receive medical treatment, but would never rise above their 
precarious sanitary conditions and deficient nutrition, arguably the main reason that 
they fall ill5. Little good was being done by providing free education to a family that 
relied on the labor of their children to eat. If Brazil were to correct five hundred years of 
neglect for the poor, universal education and healthcare had to be followed by programs 
that targeted the least economically privileged citizens and sought to improve their 
improper economic condition. Moreover, this study argues that the deployment of cash-
transfer programs in Brazil was a revolutionary policy. Never before Brazil had 
                                                          
4 Brazil Const., 1988. Art. 212  “The Union shall apply, annually, never less than eighteen percent, and 
the states, the Federal District, and the municipalities, at least twenty-five percent of the tax revenues, 
including those resulting from transfers, in the maintenance and development of education”.  
Art. 198.Paragraph 1. “The unified health system shall be financed, as set forth in article 195, with funds 
from the social welfare budget of the Union, the states, the Federal District and the municipalities, as well 
as from other sources. The Union shall spend at least eighteen percent of tax revenues”. 
 
5 Kofi Annan, “Secretary General Tells the World Health Assembly”, 17 May 2001, 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2001/sgsm7808.doc.htm 
The pronounced relation between poverty and precarious health was addressed by Former Secretary – 
General of the United Nations, Koffi Anan in a speech at the World Health Assembly in 2001 “The 
biggest enemy of health in the developing world is poverty, and the struggle for health is part and parcel 




experienced a direct and continuous redistribution of income. While programs targeting 
the poor were implemented in Brazil prior to the concept of giving money to the poor, 
these programs were not designed to redistribute income. As this research will show, 
such actions had the goal of alleviating poverty conditions, instead of establishing as 
their primary goal, moving people out of poverty. 
This research scrutinizes the social policies developed in Brazil between 1988 
and 2001 with the goal of examining the political process that combined the 
universalization of social rights and the development of social policies targeting the 
poor and, as a result, culminated in the first federal cash transfer program in Brazilian 
history6. The reasoning behind the selection of this historical period delineates two 
events that indicated a turning point in the development of anti-poverty policies in 
Brazil. The Constitution of 1988 represents a milestone in the history of social policies 
in the country with its universalization of social rights. On the other hand, the year of 
2001 became notorious for the implementation of a pioneer national cash transfer 
program, the social program Bolsa Escola inaugurated during the government of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Between the universalization of social rights and the 
implementation of the first federal cash transfer program in Brazil, other social 
programs that targeted the poor were developed and will be scrutinized in this study. 
Notwithstanding, this research argues that, although programs that provide assistance 
through accessibility to specific services or products help to alleviate the precarious 
                                                          
6 As this study will explain in more detail, cash transfer programs started in Brazil at a regional level. 
Bolsa escola was first adopted by Cristovam Buarque in the Federal District in 1995  and in the same year 
Jose Roberto Magalhães, mayor of Campinas – SP, implemented the Programa de Garantia de Renda 




conditions of the needy, they do not offer a way out of what has been labeled as a 
“poverty trap”.7 
The large majority of the academic literature that examines the impacts of cash 
transfer programs in Brazil focuses on the investigation of the subsequent, more 
comprehensive, and still in place, social program Bolsa Familia.8 This study does not 
focus on measuring the impacts of cash transfer programs on moving people out of 
poverty. The impressive numbers achieved by Bolsa Famila have already attracted the 
interest of many social scientists and have produced voluminous and illuminating 
literature on the results of the Brazilian experience with federal cash transfer programs. 
However, historiography has given little attention to the process of intellectual and 
operational creation of the concept of giving money to the poor. I argue that, it is crucial 
to have a profound understanding of the historical events that led to the revolutionary 
initiative that broke away from preconceived notions about direct income transfer. It has 
been considered that, if given money, the poor will very likely spend much of this extra 
income on alcohol, and give little care to their family´s wellbeing. This research will 
show that such assumption has been proven wrong, and if this case happens, it surely is 
not representative of the large majority of the resources applied by the poor on items 
that strive for the improvement of their socioeconomic conditions. Since this research is 
underpinned by the successful results of cash-transfer programs in Brazil, it aims to 
                                                          
7 The adoption of Federal cash-transfer programs in Brazil reduced poverty levels from 22% in 2001 to 
13% in 2007 according to the World Bank Development Indicator online database. 
 
Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (Penguin Books, 2015), 344. 
Jeffrey Sachs explains how the poverty trap works “The poor start with a very low level of capital person, 
and then find themselves trapped in poverty because the ratio of capital per person actually falls from 
generation to generation”. 
 
8 This social program was introduced by Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva, the Brazilian president from 2002 – 
2010 and encompassed the following programs that had been created by his predecessor, Fernando 




discover what institutions, events, and people were critical for the deployment of such 
initiative. Hopefully other scholars or policy makers will be able to draw on this essay 
and grasp how the cash-transfer program was an evolving process. Better ideas about 
the global fight for poverty depends upon comprehension of how successful strategies 
were created. Important variables that have not been the focus of many scholarly studies 
will be shown to have fundamental significance. Had the Constitution of 1988 not 
determined that education and medical aid were universal rights, the current cash-
transfer program model would not be viable. As I will describe in more detail, the 
Brazilian program was underpinned with two conditionalities, both of them tied to 
rights in the Constitution. Moreover, and arguably one of the most important 
examinations of this research, the first federal program in Brazilian history – Bolsa 
Escola – was not originally developed as a national initiative.  This study will also show 
the complexity of developing a cash-transfer program in Brazil given the particularity of 
the structure of federal budget. Brazilian presidents are constrained by a piece of 
legislation that prevent them from generating more spending without creating a new 
source of income first. While much of the analyses on cash-transfer programs have 
focused on the governments of former Brazilian presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
and Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva, this study shifts the focus to the regional programs 
developed in Brasilia and Campinas. Their revolutionary initiatives were the basis for 
this type of social policy. With this specific goal in mind, to undergo an historical study 
on the genesis of cash-transfer programs in Brazil, the focus of this research is to trace 
the origins of the convergence point, when the fight against poverty in Brazil aligned 





1.2 – Explanation of the Timeframe 1988 – 2001. 
 Setting the Constitution of 1988 as the starting point for this study has a logical 
explanation. The institutionalization of social rights, along with the establishment of 
minimum governmental spending on education and healthcare, posed a set of new 
challenges for the development of social programs designed to help the poor. At the 
same time that minimum standards were set and all Brazilian citizens were guaranteed 
healthcare and education, politicians could merely abide by the minimum expenditure in 
these two areas and claim to be fulfilling their social obligations to their constituents. 
Under this scenario, there is no distinction between the poor and the affluent with 
respect to access to social services since they are inherent to every citizen. However, it 
is clear in Brazil that despite the free education and health care offered by the 
government, the population with the highest income frequently opted for contracting 
private schools and health care providers.9    
Looking at the past and delving into the political debate on the diminution of 
poverty and inequality that took place in Brazil provides the opportunity to understand 
the origins of the political recognition that universal rights alone would not suffice in 
tackling these problems. To understand why cash transfer programs have arguably been 
the most successful strategy to lift people out of poverty in Brazilian history, it is 
necessary to examine the previous attempts to solve this same problem. Furthermore, a 
close scrutiny of the origins of the Brazilian experience with cash-transfer initiatives 
                                                          
9 The Ministry of Education produced a report that pointed out that despite the universalization of primary 
education, 21.5% of all enrolled children study at private schools. For the full report access: 
http://download.inep.gov.br/educacao_basica/censo_escolar/notas_estatisticas/2017/notas_estatisticas_ce
nso_escolar_da_educacao_basica_2016.pdf.  
In the area of healthcare the regulatory agency of healthcare providers estimated that in 2017 24.5% of 
the Brazilian citizens contracted private healthcare providers, despite the universalization of medical aid. 




might contribute to a better understanding of how government and society can work 
cooperatively to design more effective solutions to deal with poverty and economic 
inequality. 10 
The chapters that analyze each federal government from 1988 - 2001 aim to 
investigate the social policies developed in each government and contextualize the 
political setting that the nation experienced in each administration. For example, 
Sarney´s government overlapped with the period of the implementation of the new 
Constitution, bringing to his government a new set of challenges to adapt to the new 
obligations and duties that the document placed on his government. Investigation of the 
government of Fernando Collor de Mello must also take into consideration the 
corruption scandals of his government. The misappropriation of public funds affected 
the development of social policies and eventually led to his impeachment. Evaluating 
social policies during Itamar Franco needs to acknowledge the chaotic macroeconomic 
situation that Brazil faced in that period. As for Fernando Henrique Cardoso, we will 
see that a more stable economic environment, achieved mainly through the control of 
inflation, along with policies targeting the poor, had positive effects on moving people 
above the poverty line. 
1.3– Structure of the Chapters. 
The structure of this research is as follows: the first chapter discusses the social 
policies of the first civilian government after the military dictatorship, Jose Sarney 1985 
– 1990. He was a politician who had the mission to lead the new Brazilian democratic 
                                                          
10 Jo Guild and David Armitrage, The History Manifesto, (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 14 
The authors elaborate on how the historical approach has contributed to advise present-day politics 
through its close examination of changes over time “Historians learn how to argue about these changes by 
means of narrative, how to join explanation with understanding, how to combine the study of the 
particular, the specific, and the unique with the desire to find patterns, structures, and regularities…” 
 8 
 
wave but who actually supported the military dictatorship. His government is of special 
importance to this study since it was under his government that Brazil first undertook a 
joint social strategy of combining universalization of social rights and programs 
targeting the poor. The second chapter examines the governments of Fernando Collor de 
Mello 1990 - 1992, and of his Vice -President Itamar Franco 1992 -1994. Both 
presidents will be examined in the same chapter, since combined they served only four 
years due to the process of the impeachment of Collor de Mello.11  The third chapter 
investigates and analyzes the impact on reducing poverty of the social policies 
implemented during the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso 1995 – 2002. 
Moreover, it examines how the pioneer experiences with cash-transfer initiatives 
deployed in the municipalities of Brasilia and Campinas laid out the conceptual 
foundation for the culmination of the first federal program of cash transfer in Brazilian 
history (Bolsa Escola). The final chapter concludes with an analysis of the most 
influential social and political events during the years of 1988 – 2001 regarding the 
deployment of the concept of giving money to the poor. 
1.4 Methodological Framework and Primary Sources 
The methodological framework of this analysis is the academic literature of 
social policies that focus on the economically underprivileged. Some of the variables 
that will be scrutinized in this research are: how efficient these programs were at 
targeting the poor. Lena Lavinas’ study addresses how the Brazilian government 
invested its efforts in social programs that targeted only the poor versus more integral 
                                                          
11 “Pedro Collor Tells it All: The Vídeo and the Interview that Narrate the Attacks by the President´s 
Brother”, Veja, May 30 1992. 
His presidential decay started in May of the same year when his brother gave a bombastic interview to the 




investments to improve the overall social structure.12 Another dimension of cash-
transfer programs that will examined is if they were designed as conditional or non-
conditional programs. Laura B. Howlings provides a more encompassing study, 
assessing the impacts of conditional cash-transfer programs by studying the initiatives 
of Mexico, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Colombia. The author argues that although such 
programs have been successful at reducing poverty levels, further research work needs 
to be undergone in order to prove their replicability.13 On the other hand, Marcelo Neri 
focuses solely on the Brazilian Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Família programs and compares 
them with previous programs that were tied to the Social Security apparatus.14  
The impacts that they produced on alleviating poverty conditions have been the 
research interests of scholars.  Simone Bohn´s study investigates the impacts of cash-
transfer programs on the creation of equality of opportunities in highly unequal societies 
by drawing on the experiences of Brazil with such programs. Her examination is 
centered on three main dimensions: effectiveness to end hunger, improvement of access 
to education and healthcare, and the ability of beneficiaries to be integrated into the job 
market.15 Jeni Vaistman and Luis Faria assess how conditional cash-transfer programs 
in Brazil have widened the scope of the segment of society protected by the public 
system of social assistance. The authors argue that these programs covered a part of the 
                                                          
12 Lena Lavinas, “Gasto Social no Brasil: Programas de Transferência de Renda versus Investimento 
Social” Ciência, Saúde Coletiva 12, no.6 (2007): 1463-1476. 
13 Laura B. Rawlings, “A New Approach to Social Assistance: Latin America’s Experience with 
Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes,” International Social Security Review 58, no.3 (2005): 133-161. 
14 Marcelo Neri, “A Next Generation of Cash Transfer Programs,” Revista de Administração Pública 51, 
no.2 (2017):168-181. 
15 Simone R. Bohn, “Can Conditional Cash Transfer Programs Generate Equality of Opportunity in 




society that was not aided by the previous traditional systems of clientelism that were 
recurrent in Brazil. 16 
How successfully they moved people out of poverty is discussed in the works of 
Barrientos, Hanlon, and Hulme and Soares. 17The first study is an essential book for 
those interested in the development of cash-transfer programs worldwide. The authors 
provide compelling evidence to show that these type of programs, which discusses not 
only conditional initiatives but also non-conditional programs, have yielded positive 
results in the reduction of poverty worldwide. Serguei D. Soares compares the levels of 
reduction of inequality levels in Brazil with other countries to asses if such levels are 
considered acceptable by undergoing a close examination of the Brazilian Gini 
coefficient in comparison with the numbers presented by Mexico, United States, and 
Canada.  
In addition to the current academic literature on social programs targeting the 
poor, this study will make use of primary sources such as newspapers, magazines, 
political statements, government documents, the diaries of former president Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, and the Brazilian Constitution. Additionally, it employs data from 
the federal government on amount of resources spent on the social programs studied, 
reports of government assessment on the results that they produced, and reports of 
external agencies such as the World Bank and the United Nations assessing the 
development of social policies in Brazil. The Brazilian media will be investigated to 
understand the political rhetoric used to promote these social programs. For example, 
politicians could place emphasis on the moral obligation to assist the needy, or 
                                                          
16 Jeni Vaitsman and Luis Farias, “Social Protection in Brazil: What has changed in Social Assistance 
after the 1988 Constitution,” Ciência e Saúde Coletiva 14. No.3 (2009): 731-741. 
17 Armando Barrientos and others, Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the 
Global South (Kumarian Press 2010).  Sergei Suarez Dillon Soares, “O Ritmo da Queda da Desigualdade 
no Brasil é Aceitável?” Revista de Economia Política 30, no.3 (2010):364-380. 
 11 
 
alternatively, to promote social policies as a mechanism to enhance economic 
development. It is important to be able to draw on history in order to comprehend how 
these four presidents promoted their social policies targeting the poor as well as how 
they utilized the poor, either to enhance their local political alliances through the 
allocation of federal resources to states and municipalities, or directly as instrumental in 




















 Jose Sarney – Tudo pelo Social and an Ungovernable Country (1985 – 
1990). 
Folha de São Paulo, the largest Brazilian newspaper at the time, published in its 
cover on April 22, 1985 the following headline: “Tancredo Neves está Morto: Sarney 
Reafirma Mudanças”.18 This statement reflected the substantial fear that the death of the 
indirectly elected president Tancredo Neves, and his replacement with an old ally of the 
military, posed for Brazilian society.19 With the passing of Neves, the Brazilian 
Constitution mandated that the vice-president, José Sarney, be sworn into office.20 
Sarney had been a member of the political party of the military government ARENA, 
having served as a Senator for the state of Maranhão for that political organization up to 
1979.21 Sarney had realized that he had as his first mission to dispel any suspicions that 
his rise to the Presidency would be a threat to the return of a democratic system. Sarney 
reaffirmed that Brazil would be governed by a civilian government and that the 
                                                          
18 “Tancredo Neves is Dead: Sarney Reassures Changes” Folha De São Paulo, April 22, 1985 p. 1. 
Author´s translation. 
 
19 Tancredo Neves was elected through indirect voting by the Brazilian Congress. He ran against Paulo 
Maluf, the candidate from the political party PDS that succeeded the ruling party during the military 
dictatorship, ARENA. Neves had the support of the old political leaderships that opposed the military 
government and the dissidents from ARENA who were not pleased with the nomination of Paulo Maluf 
to be their presidential candidate. For a full account on the democratic transition of 1985 see:  
Thomas Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule 1964 -1985 (Oxford University Press 1967). 
 
20 The days when Tancredo Neves was hospitalized were filled with speculation about the process of 
succession in the case of the impossibility of Neves to take office. A segment of the political leadership 
wanted Ulysses Guimarães who was the president of the lower house to be sworn into office. Maria 
Kynzo illustrated the political setting on the verge of Sarney´s inauguration “Sarney tomou posse sem um 
plano de governo propriamente dito e com um sério déficit em legitimidade: uma figura política marcada 
por anos de vínculos com os militares, que assumia o poder sem o respaldo das urnas e que não era das 
fileiras do partido que esperava desta vez governar, o PMDB”  
Maria Dalva G Kinzo. “A Democratização Brasileira: Um Balanço Do Processo Político Desde a 
Transição.” São Paulo Em Perspectiva, vol. 15, no. 4 (2001):.5. 
 
21 The military government instituted a two-party system in 1965 through the enactment of Institutional 
Act 2. ARENA became the political party representing the government and all opposition was grouped 
into one party MDB. In 1979 with the end of the two-party system, Sarney became the president of the 




Brazilian population had no reason to fear the return of authoritarian rule “Nosso 
Governo é o Governo de Tancredo Neves” asserted  Sarney on the day that Tancredo 
Neves had died and Sarney was declared the new president.22  
Sarney’s first years in the government were marked by a succession of economic 
plans designed to reduce inflation levels and improve the macroeconomic management 
of the Brazilian economy.23 Although his government struggled to deal with the 
problematic economic situation left by the military, Sarney realized that the political 
opening process led to an increasing demand for progressive social policies by the 
Brazilian population.24 As a seasoned politician, Sarney was aware that his government 
had to push forward measures that would appease the critics of the priority that past 
Federal governments placed on economic progress over social demands. The popular 
movement entitled Diretas Já that occurred in Brazil between 1983 and 1984 was a 
clear sign that civil mobilization was entering a new era in Brazilian politics. A large 
part of the Brazilian population went to the streets to manifest their desire to have direct 
elections. 25 
                                                          
22 “Our Government is the Government of Tancredo Neves” Folha de São Paulo April 23, 1985 p. 1. 
 
23 Plano Cruzado, implemented in February 27, 1986 was the most radical of these economic plans. It 
changed the national currency from the Cruzeiro to the Cruzado and froze all prices for twelve months. 
This plan proved to be unsuccessful to deter the inflationary pressure and was followed by Plano Cruzado 
II in November of the same year and by Plano Bresser in 1987. For more information on the impacts of 
the Plano Cruzado see:  
Werner Baer, The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development. 5th ed. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001). 
 
24 The inflation levels reached a historic record at the end of 1985 with an annual inflation rate of 239%. 
For a full report on historic figures on Consumer Prices Index in Brazil see: 
http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/ExibeSerie.aspx?serid=38391 
 
25 Although this movement was not able to achieve its ultimate goal – direct elections for the next 
Brazilian presidential elections, it is regarded as playing a very important role in the redemocratization of 
Brazilian politics. For more information on the social movement Diretas Já see:  
Edison Ricardo Emiliano Bertoncelo, “‘Eu Quero Votar Para Presidente’: Uma Análise Sobre a 




2.1 - Tudo Pelo Social 
To demonstrate his commitment to a progressive social agenda Sarney’s 
government adopted the slogan Tudo Pelo Social - Everything for Social 
Development.26 In an article published in the newspaper Estado do Maranhão on 
December 14, 2014, titled “O Roubo dos Personagens”, Sarney made the remark that he 
was the president who adopted the fight for social rights as the slogan for his 
government. Sarney expressed resentment with the debate whether the current social 
programs started with former presidents Cardoso or Lula “Todos os programas sociais 
que hoje, que discutem se foi de Lula ou FHC começaram comigo”.27 Sarney listed the 
programs implemented by his government with special praise for the Programa do Leite 
and highlighted that he was the president responsible for the universalization of medical 
aid.  
However, Sarney’s adoption of the motto became a target of controversy in 
Brazilian politics. The April 10, 1988, issue of Estado de Sao Paulo highlighted how 
Sarney’s government was failing to implement effective social policies. According to 
this source, there was an abysmal discrepancy between the political propaganda and the 
actual achievements reached by the government. This story bespoke that the resources 
                                                          
26 The use of slogans by the federal government was not a novelty in Brazilian politics. The military 
government made extensive use of this strategy to convey messages of harmony and social cohesion. One 
of the most well known was used by Medici´s government in 1970 Brazil: Love it or Leave it, a direct 
reference to the political opponents that were exiled by the government. For more information on the use 
of political campaign by the military see: 
Carlos Fico, Reinventando o Otimismo – Ditadura, Progaganda e Imaginário Social no Brasil (Fundação 
Getulio Vargas 1987). 
 
27 “O Roubo dos Personagens” Estado do Maranhão, December 14, 2014, p.1.  
“All social programs that are result of debate whether they started during Lula of FHC´s administrations, 
actually started with me.” Author´s translation.  
In the same interview, Sarney credited to himself the creation of the Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS), the 
Brazilian National Health Service that was created after his government, but according to him such a 
system was already in place in his administration. According to Sarney, it was only renamed under 





allocated for the Central de Medicamentos (CEME) were ten times inferior to what 
would be necessary in order to cater to the Brazilian population that in 1988 had 
reached 144 million. 28 The Instituto Nacional de Alimentação e Nutrição (INAN), an 
autarchy attached to the Ministry of Health, that distributed food baskets to children up 
to six years old, faced the same precarious financial situation. 29 In addition, Sarney´s 
government was accused of using INAN for political gains. Since the number of food 
baskets distributed by the government was not sufficient to meet demand, priority to 
access the resources of this program was placed on political allies.  
The decentralized structure of the program enabled the misappropriation of 
resources and facilitated corruption. Funds were concentrated at the Federal level and 
then transferred to state governors. These political leaders would privilege the mayors 
with whom they had close political affiliations by granting them a larger quantity of 
food baskets to be distributed in their municipalities. Other government autarchies such 
as the Fundação de Amparo ao Estudante (FAE) and the Fundo Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento da Educação (FNDE) were also facing drastic cuts in their budgets. 
The inconstant flux of resources to finance social programs provoked in the Brazilian 
society a conviction that on every occasion that the government had to cut down costs, 
the first area to bear the consequences was social spending. 30  
                                                          
28 “Decreto 68.608, 25 de Junho,de 1971”, Presidencia da República, JusBrasil. 
The government of Medici created the agency Central de Medicamentos through the Decree 68.608. As 
this document states the function of this organization was “to promote and organize the supply, at 
affordable prices, of medicine for human use, for those whom the financial conditions do not allow them 
to access such medicine.” 
 
29 The government of Medic created in 1972 the Instituto Nacional de Alimentação e Nutrição. This 
agency had the goal of assisting the government in the formulation of a unified national nutritional 
policy. For more information on this agency see the entire decree: 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/1970-1979/L5829.htm. 
 
30 Estado de São Paulo April, 10 1988, p. 15. 
 INAN´s planning secretary Edgar Luiz Gutierrez expressed his disbelief in the Tudo Pelo Social motto 
“Quando a taxa de inflação e o desemprego aumentam junto com o déficit público, o que primeiro se 
corta são os gastos sociais. Falhando as metas econômicas, falham também as metas sociais”  
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One year after being inaugurated Sarney produced a document titled A Message 
to the National Congress. In this report the president elaborated on the challenges that 
his government had faced in its first year and the achievements reached by his 
administration. The first section of this presidential announcement outlined all the 
economic endeavors of his government in 1985, along with its economic agenda for the 
next year. Sarney advocated for a social pact that would bind together government and 
civil society in the fight against inflation.31  
 The second section of this document titled Social Priority is entirely dedicated to 
analyzing the social structure of Brazil. Sarney discussed the precarious situation that 
his government inherited, where more than thirty-eight percent of Brazilian families 
earned less than two minimum salaries, placing them in a state of extreme poverty. The 
discourse of his announcement was centered on increasing economic outputs in order to 
improve the condition of the poor “A luta permanente para superar a pobreza passa pela 
expansão do emprego, pela geração de novas oportunidades econômicas, pelo aumento 
dos sálarios”32. The same rhetoric that permeated Brazilian politics during the military 
dictatorship seemed to be replicated by Sarney.  According to him, Brazil had to focus 
its efforts on economic expansion instead of pushing reforms that aimed at 
redistributing wealth. The matter of the universalization of education and healthcare 
                                                          
 
31 There was a current among Brazilian economists that considered the Brazilian inflation not to be a 
result of an unbalanced relation between demand and supply. This group of researchers believed that the 
Brazilian inflation was inertial, being the result of the continuous projection of future inflation in 
contracts by the use of indexation. That is the reason that Sarney sought the cooperation from the civil 
society. For more on inertial inflation see:  
Pereira Bresser “A Descoberta da Inflação Inercial,” Revista de Economia Contemporânea 14, no. 1 
(2010): 167-192.. 
 
32 Biblioteca Nacional.” Biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br, 
www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/jose-sarney/mensagens-ao-
congresso/1986/mensagem-ao-congresso-nacional-1986-parte-1/view, p.48. 
 “The constant struggle to overcome poverty is linked to an expansion of employment, the creation of 
new economic opportunities, and rising wages.” Author´s translation. 
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were addressed and considered as inalienable rights for every citizen. Notwithstanding, 
this report does not outline how this process would be conducted.  
This document illustrates how the discourse on universalization of social rights 
and programs targeting the poor were intertwined, without a clear distinction between 
the different strategies that should be adopted to act in these two spheres. For example, 
Sarney states that all children under the age of fourteen would be provided with 
adequate nutrition, healthcare, and education, as an action to universalize social rights. 
To demonstrate his efforts towards the universalization of rights, Sarney described the 
actions targeting the poor that his government was pushing forward. Two other 
examples of this contradiction, are the  Programa de Abastecimento Popular (PAP), a 
program designed to sell basic foodstuffs at lower prices to needy citizens and the 
Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar (PNAE), a program that provided school 
meals in public educational institutions. However, the numbers of these programs 
demonstrated that, although the government praised the improvement of child nutrition, 
students enrolled in the public school system received less than a meal a day. According 
to this assessment, Sarney´s government increased school meals from 140 days to 180 
in 1985, thus falling short of the goal to serve food daily in the public educational 
system.33  
The Constitution of 1988 established primary education and medical aid as 
universal rights and enabled the political rhetoric to employ the universalization of 
social rights as a fundamental component of the political platform, even if there was no 
explanation on how such a platform would be accomplished, “O compromisso do 
Governo é a universalização da educação básica de boa qualidade, garantindo a todas as 
                                                          
33 Sarney, 51. 
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crianças, entre 7 e 14 anos, acesso e permanência na escolar de primeiro grau, pública e 
gratuita”.34 The universalization of education was addressed by Sarney as a commitment 
of his government rather than a legal duty as it would become posterior to the 
promulgation of the 1988 Constitution.  
2.2 - An Ungovernable Country 
On July 26, 1988 José Sarney addressed the Brazilian population in a nationally 
broadcast speech. He was concerned about the final text of the Constitution of 1988 that 
was close to being enacted in Congress. According to Sarney, the sharp increase in 
public expenditures would make the government ungovernable “Refiro-me 
particularmente a explosão dos gastos públicos decorrentes de benefícios desejáveis, 
que todos nós desejaríamos atender, mas que infelizmente não temos como atender. 35 
Sarney pointed out that in order to meet all the demands of the new Constitution, 
resources from social programs that targeted the poor would be have to be reduced “… 
retirando recursos da merenda escolar, da distribuição gratuita do leite, dos programas 
de habitação para pessoas de baixa renda”.36  Although Sarney criticized many points of 
the Constitution, fourteen according to the newspaper O Globo, the president mentioned 
that the social advancements envisaged by the Constitution should be extolled. 37 Aware 
                                                          
34 Ibdi, 58. 
“The government is committed with the universalization of primary education of good quality, 
guaranteeing to all children between 7 and 14 years old, access to primary, public, and free education.” 
Author´s translation. 
 
35 “Biblioteca Nacional.” Biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br 
www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/jose sarney/discursos/1988/65.pdf/view, 
p.30.  
 “I am referring particularly to the explosion in public expenditures, resulting from desirable benefits that 
we all would like to grant, but that unfortunately we cannot grant.” Author´s translation. 
 
36 Sarney, Discurso 1988, 35. 
Withdrawing resources from school lunch, the free distribution of milk and, from housing programs 
targeted to the poor. Author´s translation. 
 




that criticizing the social rights established by the Constitution could have political 
repercussions, Sarney restricted his criticism to other points of the document. If the 
Constitution established the source of funds to provide primary education and free 
healthcare all Brazilians, the funds for other social rights determined in the document 
were not specified.38 
The political leaders behind the promulgation of the Constitution understood the 
president´s message on the eve of the final vote on its definitive text as a threat by the 
Federal government and felt that they had to react to the presidential speech with a 
strong statement to defend the document. The Diary of the National Constitutional 
Assembly of July 28, 1988 narrates how Ulysses Guimarães, the president of the 
Assembly addressed Sarney´s statement that the Constitution of 1988 would make 
Brazil an ungovernable country “A governabilidade está no social. A fome, a miséria, a 
ignorância, a doença inassistida são ingovernáveis. A injustiça social é a negação do 
Governo e a condenação do Governo”.39 The controversy that surrounded the new 
constitution illustrated how the establishment of social rights was a delicate manner. No 
politician would dare to openly criticize the universalization of social rights under the 
political environment that Brazil experienced in 1988. Notwithstanding, the conclusion 
that the feasibility of meeting all the obligations described in the document was 
                                                          
38 Brazilian Const. Art. 6 
Besides the right to education and healthcare, article six sets as responsibilities of the state to guarantee 
food, work, leisure, security, social welfare, protection to motherhood and childhood, and assistance to 
the needy . 
 




 “The good governability needs to be centere on social issues. Hunger, misery, ignorance and, unattended 





problematic probably crossed the mind of many of the political leaders behind the 
inception of the new Constitution. 
The political climate in which the new Constitution was devised, not long after  
the twenty-one years of authoritarian rule, claimed representation in Brazilian politics 
for a more sizable civil society. In his speech during the proclamation of the 
Constitution of 1988 on October 5 of that year , Ulysses Guimarães affirmed that the 
new document represented a new era for the country. Also, Guimarães reiterated that its 
elaboration was the result of a joint collaboration between the federal government and 
civil society, “Há, portanto, representativo e oxigenado sopro de gente, de rua, de praça, 
de favela, de fábrica, de trabalhadores, de cozinheiras, de menores carentes, de índios, 
de posseiros, de empresários, de estudantes, de aposentados, de servidores civis e 
militares ...”. The Constitution symbolized this moment and became known as the 
Citizen´s Constitution, “Repito, esta será a Constituição cidadã. Porque recuperará como 
cidadãos milhões de brasileiros”. 40 The demands for social rights held more support 
than the political claims that the document could not feasibly be executed by the federal 
government. Sarney saw himself at a crossroads where he had to adopt a very cautious 
posture. At the same time that Sarney criticized the document for its financial 
infeasibility, he had to celebrate its efforts to improve the social conditions of the 
Brazilian population. As a seasoned politician, Sarney knew that, otherwise, the 
political cost could be too heavy for him to bear. 
 
                                                          
40 Guimarães, 20. 
 “I reiterate, this will be the Citizen´s Constitution. It will reclaim millions of Brazilians their sense of 
citizenship” Author´s translation. 
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2.3 - The social structure of Brazil in the years of Sarney’s government 
before the Constitution of 1988. 
A detailed report from the World Bank on public spending for social programs 
in Brazil was published in 1988. This study was a joint effort between Brazilian experts 
and World Bank´s specialists that scrutinized the structure of social spending and how 
Brazil was failing to efficiently allocate its resources to produce high levels of social 
welfare. One of the main findings of this report was that mistargeting of social resources 
was a major obstacle that the country had to overcome. It pointed out three main ways 
that mistargeting affected social efficient allocation of social spending: 
Mistargeting within sources, such as education and health, that result in 
high public subsidies for the types of programs that would reach the 
poor ii) mistargeting across sectors, with relatively high public subsidies 
for those sectors, such as social security and housing, that currently 
serve primarily the middle-class and the rich, compared with sectors, 
such as nutrition, that primarily serve the poor, and iii) failure within 
programs to reach the poorest and neediest groups. (World Bank 1988) 
 
In 1986 it was estimated that Brazil spent 6.6 percent of its budget on education 
and 8.5 percent on healthcare. As we will learn when examining the changes 
implemented in the 1988 Constitution, Brazil not only spent less on these two areas than 
in the period post-Constitution, but also suffered from a poor targeting of its resources. 
The same report points out that public expenditure was almost eighteen times higher for 
university students than for primary education. Furthermore, the Brazilian educational 
system privileged wealthy students to become university educated since the entrance 
examination to attend public universities was highly competitive and benefited students 
that had their primary education at private schools.41  Primary and secondary education 
                                                          
41 In Brazil the admission process at public universities was based solely on the score achieved on the 
entrance examination, Vestibular. Since the general rule in the Brazilian educational system is that private 
schools do a better job at educating than public schools, this occurrence reinforced low levels of social 
mobility, thus preventing the poor from having access to tertiary education. 
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amounted to 77% of all resources for public expenditure on education whereas 
university education accounted for the remaining 23%. However, the amount per 
student was estimated in US$149 per student at the primary level, US$144 at the 
secondary level and a strikingly US$ 2,586 per college student (40). Brazil spent 
approximately seventeen-fold per college student compared to expenditures on primary 
and secondary level students. 42 
In the medical care area, the lack of a centralized health system before the 
creation of the Sistema Unicos e Descentralizados de Saúde nos Estados (SUDS)  in 
1987 contributed to the leakage of public resources that were distributed among six 
government bureaucracies – INAMPS, SUCAM, CEME, FSESP, FIOCRUZ, INAN, 
and MEC and three ministries – Social Security, Health, and Education. Total spending 
per capita in healthcare in 1986 had been estimated at forty-four dollars. This amount, 
compared to the United States and England was respectively fifteen and five times 
lower.43 Another chronic problem of the healthcare system in Brazil was its 
disproportionate allocation of resources on curative versus preventive care. As Table 1 
demonstrates, in 1986, the government spent 78 percent of its healthcare investment on 
curative care. This figure contrasted drastically with the early numbers of 1949 when 
curative care amounted to 13 percent of all healthcare expenditure. The new trend that 
                                                          
 
42 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), issued a report titled 
Education at a Glance, assessing educational systems in 35 countries. According to this report, in 2016, 
Brazil still spent more on college students than on students from the primary level. While, the country 
spends U$ 3,800 annually per student from the 1st to the 5th grade, expenditures on college students reach 
the amount of U$11,700 per student. For the full report access:  
“Education at a Glance”, 2016, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/education-at-a-glance-2016_eag-
2016-en 
 
43 Although the United States expenditure on health care is high, coverage is lower compared to other 
developed nations, therefore demonstrating the high costs associated with the medical aid sector in the 
country. For more on the healthcare system in the United States see the reports by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality available at 




centered the largest portion of the resources assigned to health care on medical 
treatments had dramatic consequences for the rural population. Massive governmental 
investment was allocated to the construction of large hospitals that were generally 
located in urban areas. Consequently, the rural population faced a situation where local 
investments in healthcare were not a governmental priority, thus forcing them to travel 
to urban areas to be medically treated. 44 
Table 1 -Brazilian Public Health Care Spending, Curative and Preventive 
Shares, Selected Years 1949 – 1986. 
Year Curative % Preventive % 
1942 13 87 
1965 36 64 
1969 59 41 
1975 70 30 
1982 85 15 
1986 78 22 




The report concludes that Brazil was failing to concentrate resources on the least 
economically privileged stratum of the society. The inefficiency of the government to 
not target the needy and instead concentrate the greatest volume of its resources towards 
the wellbeing of the middle and upper stratums proved to be costly and deepened the 
inequality among classes. It is important to highlight another dimension of the 
devastating results of placing emphasis on curative care rather than preventive care. 
                                                          
44 For a detailed study on preventive and curative healthcare in Brazil see:  
Janine Vieira Teixeira, “Universalidade Do Atendimento a Saúde No Brasil: Impasses e Perspectivas.” 




This development was aggravated by the fact that in Brazil, before the Constitution of 
1988, only formally employed citizens were covered by the governmental health care 
structure. Besides, being more costly, since preventing a disease is cheaper than curing 
it, curative care reached only this group of citizens, those employed in the formal sector.  
2.4 - Programa do Leite 
Albeit the focus of this research is to examine social policies in Brazil that 
occurred between 1988 – 2001, the fact that this program was continued after the 
promulgation of the Constitution of 1988, enables this research to make an exception 
and analyze a social program created in 1986 – Programa Nacional do Leite Para 
Crianças Carentes . This program was designed with the goal of improving nutrition of 
poor children by providing one liter of milk per child per day. In order to be eligible to 
receive this assistance, children had to be under the age of seven and belong to 
households that earned up to approximately 587 dollars monthly.45 The government 
provided that families were granted a voucher that could be exchanged at any retailer. 
At its peak, this program became responsible for 30% of all milk sold in Brazil. One 
interesting aspect of this program was its targeting and conditionality. By targeting the 
program only for families that received up to two salarios minimos the government 
allocated resources of fifty million dollars that reached 4.1 million children by 1987. 
The government´s goal was to reach ten million children by 1989 and distribute a total 
of 3.65 billion liters of milk annually.   
                                                          
45 This amount is estimated considering the current Salario Minimo in Brazil of 954 reais multiplied by 2 
since the Programa do Leite established that the eligibility for the program was a household income less 
than 2 Salarios Minimos. The amount of 1908 reais – the Brazilian currency - was then converted to 




 The World Bank report pointed out that Brazil was incompetent at targeting the 
poor and if the same national resources were applied more efficiently, the poor could be 
greatly benefited “… if the total amount of US$1.9 billion could be targeted efficiently 
to the 19 percent of the Brazilian population living on household income of less than 
one-quarter of a minimum- salary per capita, each of those persons would receive a 
subsidy of US$74 a year, raising their income by at approximately 60 percent”.46 This 
conclusion reinforced the idea that the challenge of improving social conditions for the 
needy might rely more on the efficient allocation of resources then on increasing the 
volume of funding for social policies. 
As table 2 illustrates, Brazil was spending over sixty-five percent of its total 
budget for nutrition actions on programs that included the middle and upper classes – 
Wheat Subsidy and PAT (Programa de Alimentação do Trabalhador) - instead of 
allocating the majority of its resources on programs that targeted the impoverished. The 
wheat subsidy extended its benefits to all wheat consumers and growers, while PAT did 
not establish that only workers with low income should be granted this benefit, 
therefore reaching out its coverage to employees in the middle and upper classes. In 
addition, PAT had the highest cost per beneficiary and the largest part of its recipients 
was composed of male adults.  
In similar fashion, the School Lunch Program was not restricted to the needy. 
All children enrolled in primary or preschool at the public educational system were 
entitled to a meal. This was the most expensive and the most far-reaching food program, 
extending its assistance to approximately thirty million children by 1986. The 
PSA/MCH –Programa de Suplementação Alimentar was targeted exclusively to 
                                                          




pregnant women. PAP (Programa de Abastecimento Popular) and PROAB (Programa 
de Abastecimento de Alimentos Básicos em Áreas de Baixa Renda) were targeted at the 
poor and held in their eligibity prerequisites, evidence of low household income. These 
programs consisted in the national government selling basic food items to local retailers 
that had obtained federal authorization to resell them at a fixed margin. The PCA 
(Programa Complementar de Alimentação) was  another program targeted at pregnant 
women and provided assistance to more than one million mothers in 1986.  
TABLE 2 – Nutrition Program Spending, 1986 (US$) 
Program Total Spending US$ millions Spending per beneficiary 
Wheat Subsidy  - WPS 1,100 8 
PAT worker feeding 156 45 
PSA/MCH posts 173 21 
School Lunch 364 12 
PAP Favelas 25 6 
PROAB Favelas 13 8 




Total 1,912  




No technical reports were elaborated to explain why children past the age of 
seven should not be eligible for this benefit. It is known in the academic literature on 
social policies that the process of deciding who is eligible for a program can be 
considered the most controversial aspect concerning social programs.  Barrientos, 
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Hanlon, and Hulmes indicate that when making this decision, policy makers should 
center their analysis on the ways that the chosen forms of targeting will foster civil 
cohesion and be financially and politically sustainable in the long term. 47 In the case of 
the Programa do Leite, we observe that the establishment of seven, as the limit age, did 
not seem to be grounded on empirical data that indicated that this targeting would 
bolster financial and political sustainability.  
The structure created by the government to operationalize this program became 
one of the major flaws of this social plan. Although by 1987 twelve million children 
would fit into the criteria to receive this benefit, only one-third of this number had 
actually been granted a liter of milk per day. The government utilized coupons that 
became known as tickets do Sarney that had to be exchanged for liters of milk. As Cohn 
points out “Para além dos vários problemas que esse programa apresentou, entre eles a 
transformação do tíquete em moeda corrente, a pressão do comerciante que vinculava a 
troca do tíquete por leite à compra de outros produtos”.48 Retailers would condition the 
exchange of coupons to the purchase of other products. The lack of state bureaucrats to 
manage the program, especially in many remote areas in the Northeast where state 
penetration is low and malnutrition was high allowed exploitation of the beneficiaries 
through the sale of coupons at a discount rate. 
 Another issue with the Programa do Leite was the fact that the consumption of 
milk increased to levels that forced the government to import milk. It is estimated that 
                                                          
47 Armando Barrientos and others, Just Give Money to the Poor The Development Revolution from the 
Global South. (Kumarian Press 2010):98. 
 
48 Amelia Cohn, “Políticas Sociais e Pobreza No Brasil.” Planejamento e Políticas Públicas, no. 12, June 
(1995): 13.  
Among the various problems presented by the introduction of this program, were the conversion of tickets 
to cash and the pressure by the vendors to condition the redemption of tickets to the purchase of other 




between the years of 1986 and 1990 the production of milk increased twenty-one 
percent and per capita consumption went from 94 liters/year to 109 by the end of 
Sarney´s government (Belik, Da Silva, and Tagaki 2001). 49 Given the fact that the 
Programa do Leite became responsible for thirty percent of this consumption, this 
policy not only restricted the access to the needy to one specific product, but also could 
result in an unbalanced situation where the milk production chain was heavily 
dependent on the continuation of this governmental subsidy. 
The inflexibility of the program in terms of products or benefits for the poor was 
criticized when Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva decided to bring this program back into his 
social agenda in 2003.50 On November 30, 2003 Folha de SP discussed how the 
initiative of reintroducing the distribution of milk was not an intelligent strategy.  
According to the then president of the Federal Council of Dieticians, Rosane 
Nascimento, by adopting this program the government was moving backwards. The 
government was not following nutritional research that did not place cow’s milk as a 
key component of a healthy diet “Retomar a distribuição de leite é um retrocesso. 
Nutricionalmente não cabe. Só vejo uma justificativa: a mercadológica".51  Rosane 
stated that besides the fact that cow´s milk alone does not fulfill all of children´s 
                                                          
49 The authors point out the impulse on milk consumption stemmed from the Milk Program. In their 
assessment, the government-driven rise in demand created on unbalanced supply and demand that drove 
farmers to increase their investments on milk production. Once the program was extinguished, milk 
consumption returned to similar levels of pre-program putting the farmers in a burdensome position to 
honor their loan payments. For the full article see:  
José Graciano da Silva, Walter Belik and Maya Tagaki: “Projeto Fome Zero: Uma proposta de Política 
Alimentar para o Brasil” São Paulo em Perspectiva, vol. 15, no 4 (2001): 119-129. 
 
50 Under this program, families with income inferior to two monthly minimum – salaries would be 
eligible to receive two liters of milk per day. This program was part of the strategy devised by Lula´s 
government to end hunger in Brazil – Fome Zero (Zero Hunger). 
 
51 “Nada Se Cria: Lula Retoma Programa Do Leite Lançado Por Sarney.” Folha De S.Paulo, 
www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc3011200302.htm.  
Reprising the distribution of milk represents a setback. It does not conform with nutritional knowledge. I 
can only find one justification for such an act - business interests. Author´s translation. 
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nutritional needs, poor families should have the right to decide what types of foods they 
desire to consume.  
Despite its flaws in design, targeting and community outreach, the Programa do 
Leite contributed to the decrease of infant mortality levels in Brazil. Table 3 shows the 
evolution of infant mortality levels in Brazil during the decades between 1960 and 
1990. The data is presented at the federal level and also divided by regions, illustrating 
the pronounced discrepancy of social indicators within the country. 
TABLE 3 – Mortality rate in Brazil divided by regions (‰) 
Year Brazil North Northeast Southeast South Middle West 
1950 135 145 175 122 109 119 
1960 124 122.9 164.1 110 96 115 
1970 115 104.3 146.4 96.2 81.9 89.7 
1980 82.8 79.4 117.6 57 58.9 69.6 
1990 48.3 44.6 74.3 33.6 27.4 31.2 
Source: Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatística – IBGE. Evolução e Perspectiva da Mortalidade Infantil no 
Brasil (1999). 
 
As Table 3 demonstrates, infant mortality rate at the federal level fell by 41.6 per 
cent during the 1980´s. No other decade since the 1950´s had experienced such a 
decrease. Even during the age of the so-called economic miracle 1969 – 1973 when the 
Brazilian economy grew at a rate of over ten percent a year, infant mortality was not 
reduced significantly. The report Evolução e Perspectiva da Mortalidade Infantil no 
Brasil (1999) produced by the government points out the sharp decrease in infant 
mortality levels in the years between 1980 and 1990. According to the report, it can be 
attributed mainly to governmental interventions in the areas of healthcare, nutrition, and 
the lower fertility rates after the implementation of the Family Planning Program in 
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1974, which promoted the use of contraceptive pills. One of the characteristics of the 
Brazilian history is the acknowledgement that periods of robust economic growth did 
not necessarily translate into better socioeconomic indicators. The staggering numbers 
of Table 3 during the decade of 1950 were partly produced during the government of 
Juscelino Kubitschek´s  1956-1961, which had as its main slogan Fifty Years in Five, 
alluding to the rapid advancements that the economy would experience in his 
administration. However, this same advancement was not reflected in the social area. 
The same pattern was true in the subsequent decade, a period that witnessed the 
beginning of the era that became known as the economic miracle. Nonetheless, the 
infant mortality rate in Brazil during this decade yielded meager improvement in the 
infant mortality rates. 
Sarney is still very proud of the achievements of his government in the social 
area. When talking about the accomplishments of his government he mentions the 
progressive social agenda implemented by his administration. In his assessment, he was 
responsible for the genesis of subsequent social programs put into action in subsequent 
governments. In an interview for the Agência Senado in 2008, Sarney was asked about 
his apparent hesitation to approve the universalization of social rights established in the 
Constitution of 1998.52 Sarney responded stating that the motto of his government was 
Tudo Pelo Social - Everything for Social Development demonstrating his commitment 
to improve the social conditions of the needy citizens. Furthermore, his concern was 
exactly what, in his opinion, eventually happened: the commitment to budgetary 
obligations that were incompatible with the state´s capacity to meet such contracts. 
                                                          
52 For the full interview access :  






When asked about what would happen if the constituents had approved under those 
circumstances a project like Bolsa Família, Sarney stated that it would be compatible 
with the spirits of the Constitution and that Lula took a major step forward when he 
created this program. 
Assessing the reduction of extreme poverty levels during the Sarney 
administration, it is noticeable that a sharp decline occurred in 1986 (table 4). 
Previously, the number of Brazilians living under extreme poverty was 20.2 percent and 
that number was reduced by nearly 50 percent in 1986. This downward change in 
poverty levels during this specific year has been attributed to the economic plan Plano 
Cruzado, which had as its main measures the freezing of all prices and the introduction 
of a new currency –The Cruzado.53 However, as Table 5 displays, this improvement in 
extreme poverty levels was not long-lasting. After the subsequent failure of the 
stabilization plan and the return of rampant inflation, extreme poverty levels returned to 
pre-Cruzado Plan levels. By the end of Sarney´s government, the president left the 
country with extreme poverty levels higher than the numbers prior to his administration- 








                                                          
53 Along with the freezing of prices, Sarney´s government raised wages by sixteen percent, therefore 
increasing wages by a significant percentage. This measurement had a positive impact on the reduction of 
poverty but it as soon proved not to be sustainable. Once inflationary pressure returned, prices soared and 




TABLE 4: Levels of Extreme Poverty in Brazil 








Source: Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada –Brasil. Sobre a Evolução Recente 
da Pobreza e Desigualdade.  
 
The numbers for extreme poverty during these years, with the exception of 1986, 
demonstrate that the social policies developed during Sarney´s government had little 
impact on the reduction of poverty in Brazil. In addition, these numbers indicate that the 
character of Brazilian poverty could be classified as chronic. The other classification of 
poverty -transient poverty - has been defined as household income or consumption 
around the poverty line but with most, observations above the poverty line. In the case 
of Brazil it is observable that its poverty is chronic, where families are constantly below 
the poverty line and present high levels of intergenerational poverty. 
 
2.5 – Conclusion 
The government of Jose Sarney has special significance for understanding the 
political  process that combined universalization of social rights and programs targeting 
the poor that led to the the first federal-cash transfer program in Brazil. Through the 
examination of Sarney´s social policies and political statements before and after the 
Constitution of 1988 we can observe that the concept of implementing a federal cash-
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transfer programs was never part of his political platform.  The World Bank report with 
its detailed examination of the social structure before the Constitution of 1988, points 
out that Brazil was failing to target its social programs to the poor. The high levels of 
per capita spending for university students exceeded the investment on education for 
students enrolled in preschool and primary school by seventeen-fold. This scenario 
sheds light on the failure of the government to efficiently allocate its resources to 
benefit the needy.  
Similar logic can be found in the allocation of nutrition program spending. More 
than half of the expenditures on nutrition programs went to programs that did not target 
the poor. The two programs that accounted for the largest portion of the budget for 
nutrition programs benefited all consumers and growers of wheat (wheat subsidy), 
whereas the Programa de Alimentação do Trabalhador (PAT) aided mostly the adult 
male population. The Programa do Leite despite, all its flaws in its decentralized 
structure, community outreach, and inflexibility in terms of allowing the beneficiaries to 
decide what type of food they want to choose, contributed to reducing the infant 
mortality rates 46.1 percent in the years between 1980 and 1990. In the health care area, 
spending before the Constitution of 1988 was predominately placed on curative care 
instead of focusing on measures targeting prevention. Since the majority of the medical 
services was provided by the Previdência Social, a governmental agency funded by the 
contributions of the working class, most of the medical treatment benefits reached the 
middle and upper class.  
It is clear that the rhetoric during Sarney´s government was not dissimilar from 
the discourse of the military government. Whereas the military believed that to be able 
to distribute wealth, Brazil first had to concentrate efforts to create and expand a solid 
and robust economy, Sarney in his Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional in 1986 
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developed a similar narrative to that of the military government. In Sarney’s words, the 
fight for poverty begins with the expansion of employment, new economic 
opportunities, and the increase of wages. Although in the same document Sarney stated 
that Brazilian society owned the necessary resources to offer a decent standard of living 
to all its citizens, there is no evidence that a cash-transfer program designed to 
redistribute wealth was in the plans of the government.  The minimal variation in the 
levels of extreme poverty, with the exception of the ephemeral improvement in 1986, 
indicate that the social policies designed to aid the needy failed to move people out of 
the poverty trap.  
Through an examination of the political rhetoric in the years of Sarney´s 
government that preceded the Constitution of 1988 it is clear that the universalization of 
education and health care were used as a critical component of the government´s 
platform. Sarney’s political statements affirmed the relevance of programs targeting the 
poor as the proper direction to achieve the universalization of education. He made no 
clear distinction between  the concepts of universalism and targeting the poor before the 
Constitution of 1988. The principle that the rights to primary education and health care 
were obligations of the government, along with the determination of the minimum 
expenditure in these two areas, forced politicians to disentangle the particularities of the 
two concepts. The social structure of Brazil experienced profound changes. Programs 
that only targeted a given social class could not be disguised as having the goal to  
achieve the universalization of social rights. On the other hand, if politicians settled 
only for strict compliance to the Constitution, the acute income gap existent in Brazil 
would remain unchanged. It was only after 1988 that Brazil adopted a dual approach to 
fight poverty: universalization of social rights along with programs targeting the poor. 
Sarney sensed that the Constitutional mandates would be burdensome and costly to the 
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government and made remarks that, in order to meet all its social demands, resources 
from social programs targeting the poor must be limited. 
His threat that the replaced legislation would make Brazil an ungovernable 
country did not resonate with the National Assembly and the new Constitution was 
approved with a more rigid structure in terms of government spending on social areas. 
As we will see in the next chapter, Fernando Collor de Mello and Itamar Franco both 


















 Fernando Collor de Mello and his National Reconstruction Project 
 
 On March 15, 1990, Fernando Collor de Mello took office after having defeated 
Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva in the second round.54 Collor de Mello’s inaugural speech, 
titled The National Reconstruction Project, delineated the five main areas that would 
form the base of his political platform. Along with democracy and citizenship; the State 
reform and the modernization of the economy; ecological concern; the Brazilian 
position within the contemporary world, Collor set the social debt as one of the pillars 
of his government.55 Collor devoted most of his inaugural speech to the importance of 
economic stabilization through the control of the inflation that had reached the alarming 
rates of over 2,000% between 1988 and 1989. 
When Collor addressed the issue of the social structure of Brazil he brought into 
the political discourse an element that represented at least a partial disassociation from 
the rhetoric presented by Sarney. Whereas Sarney had stated that the fight to overcome 
poverty should be concentrated on increasing economic outputs, Collor attempted to 
please the supporters of redistributive social policies by distancing his government from 
the belief that economic growth was the best alternative to improve poor people´s lives 
“... ingênua crença de que a melhoria do padrão de vida das massas deriva 
automaticamente do crescimento econômico” .56 However, Collor by no means 
                                                          
54 This record only changed in 2014 when Dilma Rouseff and Aécio Neves established the closest 
presidential election to this day. Dilma defeated Aécio by a difference of less than four percent. For more 
information on the results of the Brazilian presidential elections access: http://www.tse.jus.br/eleitor-e-
eleicoes/eleicoes/eleicoes-anteriores 
 
55 Fernando Collor de Mello, “Brasil : Um Projeto De Reconstrução Nacional.” Início, Brasília : Senado 
Federal (2008), www2.senado.leg.br/bdsf/item/id/243024.  
In Brazil the term social debt refers to the idea that the government should look for the needs of the poor. 
 
56 Collor, National Reconstruction, 11. 
“The naïve belief that the improvement of the standard of living of the masses, automatically results from 
economic growth.”. Author´s translation. 
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explained how his government would provide better standards of living to its poor 
population other than by producing a consistent and efficient economic performance “... 
o verdadeiro bem-estar coletivo, o progresso social duradouro, só ocorrem quando se 
assegura e se mantém um nível elevado de desempenho econômico e, por conseguinte 
de prosperidade geral”.57 When Collor employs the concept of redistribution of wealth it 
is immediately followed by an explanation that such redistribution is only achieved after 
economic stabilization is accomplished.  
Não concebemos a modernidade sem sua componente de justiça, nem o 
progresso sem que todas possam beneficiar-se de seus frutos. A finalidade maior 
de meu Governo é libertar o Brasil da vergonha da miséria e da injustiça. Mas 
como sou um democrata moderno e não um demagogo populista, tenho 
consciência de que, aqui também, impõe-se a estabilização financeira para que o 
investimento volte a irrigar nosso aparelho produtivo.58 
 
As discussed in chapter one, Sarney, before the Constitution of 1988, used the 
goal of universalization of social rights as a crucial component of his political platform. 
Collor had to resort to a different strategy to appease the anti-market sentiment of the 
portion of the population that no longer believed that the market could be the driving 
force to fight poverty, “Que esta posição fique clara: não deixarei o problema da 
pobreza à mercê do automatismo do mercado” .59  On the other hand, Collor attempted 
to signal to the market that no progressive politics of redistribution of wealth should be 
                                                          
 
57 Ibid, 13. 
“True collective well-being and long-lasting social progress, only occurs when an elevated level of 
economic performance is assured, thus creating wide prosperity”. Author´s translation  
 
58 Ibid, 14. 
“Our government does not conceive either modernity without its component of justice, or progress 
without the condition that all can enjoy its benefits. The ultimate purpose of my government is to free 
Brazil from the shameful condition of misery and injustice. But since I am a modern democrat, not a 
demagogue populist, I am aware that to achieve these goals, it is imperative to provide financial 
stabilization and to foster economic investment. ”Author´s translation. 
 
59 Ibid, 15. 





expected soon, “Mas tampouco recaíremos na facilidade do social sem amanhã, do 
alívio efêmero, do redistributivismo inconsequente em prejuízo do esforço produtivo”.60  
Collor adopted this ambiguous narrative as a solution to attempt to please everyone and 
to dissociate his government from past notions of social and economic development. By 
criticizing welfare and market fundamentalism, he attempted to set himself as the new 
alternative to the country, even if this new alternative could not provide a clear scheme 
on how improvements would be accomplished.   
The process of impeachment that culminated in the removal of Collor de Mello 
will not be examined in detail in this research. However, it is important to note that his 
government only lasted two years due to a corruption scandal that involved the 
economic sector of his government. Collor and his network of corrupt politicians 
siphoned resources from social programs and established a systematic strategy of 
commissions that were charged through the approval of amendments to the budget that 
were presented by other legislators. Some of the amendments concerned resources for 
social assistance that were never put into practice. Shell companies were created to 
channel these resources that would be distributed among the politicians involved in this 
corruption scheme. This author has not been able to find any empirical evidence, nor 
academic research, that demonstrates the exact impact of the misappropriation of 
resources from social aid to the deterioration of living conditions of people entitled to 
such assistance. However, it is clear that, had these resources been employed for the 
welfare of the needy, more positive results to improve poor people´s conditions would 
have been achieved. As will be described in more detail, one of the main vehicles to 
operationalize this corruption scheme was a newly created ministry that replaced the 
                                                          
60 Ibid, 16. 
“Nor we rely on the convenience of unstainable social polies, the ephemeral relieve and, the 
inconsequential relief in prejudice of productive effort”. Author´s translation. 
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Secretaria Especial de Ação Comunitária engineered during  the government of José 
Sarney. 
3.1 - The creation of the Ministério da Ação Social: 
Fernando Collor de Mello instituted the Ministry of Social Action in 1990. The 
attributions of this new governmental agency were listed in Decree Law 8.028 a) social 
assistance b) civil defense, c) housing and sanitation policies, and d) internal migrations. 
The heterogeneity of the responsibilities of the ministry are an indication of how the 
government approached the issue of developing effective social policies. The strategy of 
dealing with social assistance as a malleable concept confirms Collor’s lack of a clear 
social strategy. At the same time, that he constantly addressed the social debt of Brazil 
to its citizens, Collor failed to give the proper attention to social matters by deploying a 
structured governmental apparatus to deal with social issues. Fagnani describes that the 
creation of a new autarchy that, despite being named Ministry of Social Action, 
encompassed other facets of government that implemented fragmented social actions, 
“As iniciativas do Ministério da Ação Social tinham em comum a extrema 
fragmentação de ações e programas, a pulverização de recursos em ações pontuais (em 
geral sem base técnica para balizar essas transferências)”. 61 In addition to the lack of 
cohesion of the social policies, the Ministerio da Ação Social did not develop 
mechanisms to supervise the efficient allocation of financial resources employed in 
these social programs. As was later discovered when the corruption scheme was 
revealed to the public, there was no intention of establishing a strict control and 
                                                          
61 Eduardo Fagnani, “Política Social e Pactos Conservadores No Brasil: 1964/92.” Economia e Sociedade, 
no. 8 (June 1997) : 130.  
 “The initiatives of Ministerio da Ação Social  had in common the extreme fragmentation of actions and 
programs, the wide spread of resources over specific actions (generally, not grounded in technical 




measurement of social policies since this would uncover the misappropriation by 
government officials of these funds. 
 
3.2 - Collor´s wife runs the Legião Brasileira de Assistência 
The Legião Brasileira de Assistência had been created by Darcy Vargas, the 
wife of former Brazilian president Getulio Vargas, by Decree - Law 4.830 on October 
15, 1942. Its main purpose was to provide social services either directly or with the 
collaboration of specialized companies. 62 At the time of its creation, the government 
had a special concern with the lives of the families of soldiers that were sent to fight in 
the World War ll.63 It became a common practice that the first ladies would be the heads 
of this organization that, became a more encompassing agency after the end of the 
World War II, assisting all families in need.64 At the time of Rosane Collor´s 
administration, the Legião Brasileira de Assistência had an annual budget of one billion 
dollars and 9,400 employees. It did not take long until the first accusations of corruption 
within LBA started to be exposed by the Brazilian media. The newspaper Jornal do 
Brasil on September 1, 1991, read the following headline: “O Sonho Acaba para a 
Cinderela de Canapi”.65 In the next two days, the newspaper published devastating 
evidence that tied Rosane Collor with a network that had been created to misappropriate 
                                                          
62 For a full description of the decree law see: 
“Decreto Lei 4830”, 15 October 1942, http://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/declei/1940-1949/decreto-lei-
4830-15-outubro-1942-414830-publicacaooriginal-1-pe.html 
 
63 For more information on the history of LBA see:  
Silvana Guilherme Simili, “O que virou moda na Guerra? As voluntárias da Legião Brasileira de 
Assistência” XVIII Encontro Regional de História – O historiador e seu tempo. ANPUH/SP (2006): 1-10. 
 
64 The LBA was created under the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice and Interior Affairs – Decree 
6013 from October1, 1942. It was then transferred to the Ministry of Work and Social Security in 1969 – 
Decree – Law 593. In 1990 it was then put under the authority of the newly created Ministério da Ação 
Social by Collor de Mello –Decree 99.244. 
65 “O Sonho Acaba Para a Cinderela De Canapi.” Jornal Do Brasil, 1 Sept. 1991, p. 1.  




public funds through the creation of shell companies and the overpricing of products 
and services contracted by the LBA. The Brazilian magazine Veja from September 4, 
1991, also reported the corruption accusations in the LBA as its cover story. This 
reportage was titled The Scandal in the LBA. It illustrated on its first page a photo of an 
apparently saddened Rosane Collor with her head down alluding her shame with the 
disgrace brought into LBA through the accusations of corruption.66  
The report indicated that the LBA was being plundered in a range of forms. 
Though there was no official account on the volume of resources defrauded during 
Rosane´s administration, preliminary calculations could detect the usurpation of at least 
ten million dollars. These funds, instead of being applied to the welfare of needy people, 
had been confiscated by public officials and business persons with close contact with 
the Collor family. One case mentioned in the report described how the LBA had hired a 
company owned by Rosane´s brother to provide water to Rosane´s hometown, Canapi, 
and despite being paid U$227,000, did not deliver a single gallon of water. 67 The 
practice of hiring relatives to run social projects became a usual procedure in Rosane´s 
administration. Another similar case occurred in a different town – Mata Grande - a 
company owned by Rosane’s father´s cousin was commissioned to provide water but 
never performed the work. Also, her sister-in- law was responsible for the Association 
Pró-Carente de Canapi, an organization that received more than U$400,000 to deliver 
vocational workshops but never graduated a single student during its existence. 
                                                          
66 “Escândalo Na LBA.” Veja , 4 Sept. 1991, p. 1.  
 
67 This figure has been calculated to present-day value with the help of the website of Fundação de 
Economia e Estatística. The original amount of 59 billion cruzeiros was translated to reais and then 




Perhaps the most scandalous case that struck LBA was the purchase of food 
baskets that were distributed to low income families. Between December of 1990 and 
January 1991, 235,639 food baskets were purchased to be distributed among the poor 
population of her home state of Alagoas.68 However, the records of government 
accounts indicated that less than 80,000 food baskets had actually been distributed. In 
addition, each food basket cost the government 4,500 cruzeiros, more than double the 
price of the same products from local retailers. This was not the first accusation of 
corruption within the LBA. The newspaper Folha de São Paulo had previously reported 
that 6,930 food baskets had been purchased in São Paulo and in July of the same year, 
the same source published a report that examined the purchase process of the food 
baskets in the first year of Rosane Collor as the head of the organization.69 According to 
Folha de SP, 40 percent of all food baskets acquired by LBA did not follow the 
common procedure of public competitive bidding.70 Out of 1.54 million food baskets 
purchased by the LBA, 628 thousand had been bought directly from companies chosen 
by the organization. In her defense, Rosane Collor argued that the practice of acquiring 
products or services without following the recommended procedure was due to urgency 
for benefits to arrive in the hands of the recipients in the shortest time possible. 
Nonetheless, the media sources (Veja, Folha de SP, O Globo, Jornal do Comércio) 
found evidence that in many instances the immediate emergency alleged by Rosane 
would only occur at the moment of purchase, and the same promptness was not applied 
                                                          
68 In 2001. Rosane Collor was sentenced by the Court of Audit of the Union to pay 1.8 million reais for 
administrative improbity incurred during her period as the president of the Legião Brasileira de 
Assistência.  
69 LBA - SP Compra Cestas Básicas Sem Licitação.” Folha De São Paulo, 6 Feb. 1991, p. 5.  
 
70 The Brazilian legislation allows the government to purchase without public bidding if such acquisitions 
can be proven to be of extreme urgency. Otherwise, government purchases are bound to follow the 
required procedures that include public bidding, competition among companies, and a due diligence 




when delivering the acquired products or services. Food baskets that were purchased 
without public bidding due to their immediate emergency would be stored for months. 
Similarly, companies hired to provide water to the Northeast states, a region that has 
been plagued with a long history of severe droughts, never delivered a single liter of 
water. 71 
 Also, similar to what allegedly happened in the case of the distribution of milk 
during Sarney´s government, the distribution of food baskets served electoral purposes. 
It was estimated that forty percent of all food baskets were distributed in the states of 
Alagoas and Bahia. In these two states, the Federal government had strong political 
interests, the former being Collor´s home state and the latter was holding elections for 
Governor where Collor supported the candidate Carlos Magalhães. Therefore, targeting 
of the distribution of food baskets, did not follow the premise that the most needy 
stratum of the society should be the proper recipients of the baskets. The Legião 
Brasileira de Assistência used the food basket program as a mechanism to ensure that 
this program would enhance Collor´s political dominance. Another deficiency detected 
in the structure of the LBA was the criteria to select the employees that would be 
managing the organization. Only in the state of Alagoas, seventy-five relatives of 
Fernando and Rosane Collor occupied governmental positions, many of them playing 
important roles in social organizations.72 
 
                                                          
71 The scarcity of water in the northeast region known as Sertão, remains a conundrum in the Brazilian 
landscape. A series of unsuccessful governmental projects have been deployed to counter the severe lack 
of water in the region. By 2017 this region had been afflicted by the longest period of draught in its 
history, more than five years without rain. 
 
72 Nepotism was not a novelty in Brazilian politics. A study developed by Almerinda Alves de Oliveira 
scrutinizes the employment of nepotism in the public sphere and its association with corruption:  
Almerinda Alves Oliveira, “Nepotismo na Administração Pública Brasileira: Panorama Histórico e 




  3.3 -Lei Orgânica da Saúde and the Creation of SUS 
The Constitution of 1988 represented a milestone in the social history of Brazil 
by establishing access to healthcare, along with other social rights, as inalienable rights 
for all Brazilian citizens and as a duty of the government to provide this service to its 
population. Before the Constitution of 1988, the area of healthcare was a responsibility 
of the Instituto Nacional de Assistência Médica da Previdência Social (INAMPS), an 
autarchy subordinated to the Ministry of Social Security and Assistance. As seen in the 
chapter on Sarney´s government, medical aid was funded through Social Security 
revenues. Consequently, public healthcare coverage was provided to the formal working 
class - the contributors to the Social Security system and the eligible group for its 
medical coverage. A report issued by the Ministry of Health in 2002 examined the 
Brazilian public health system and summarized how Brazilian society was divided 
regarding access to medical aid “ 1 – those who could pay for the services; 2 – those 
who had INAMPS coverage; 3 – those who had absolutely no rights”.73 This report also 
highlighted how the health system before 1988 contributed to increasing the high levels 
of inequality within different regions in Brazil. Regions that presented higher numbers 
of workers in the formal sector consequently had a higher number of beneficiaries and 
required more resources from the INAMPS.  
Table 5 illustrates how, under this system, the wealthiest regions of Brazil were 
also the largest recipients of public funding, deepening the precarious situation of the 
needy in the most impoverished regions of the country. The two poorest regions, the 
north and the northeast, received together little more than 20 percent of all federal 
spending. On the other hand, the two regions that presented higher economic 
                                                          




development – the southeast and the south – were recipients of almost sixty percent of 
all public funding for medical aid. The inadequate distribution of resources within the 
Brazilian territory, along with the inefficient targeting of medical aid were main 
components of the perpetuation of income inequalities. Moreover, the governmental 
emphasis on curative care instead of preventive care, as seen in the previous chapter, 
was another integral component to the failure of the public health system to take care of 
the segment of its population that most needed its assistance. 
 
Table 5: Regional Inequality on Spending on Medical Aid in Brazil in 1986 
Region Percentage of Federal 
Medical Aid  
Percentage of National 
Population 
North 2.27 5.48 
Northeast 18.10 28.82 
Southeast 59.28 43.79 
South 15.14 15.12 
Middle-West 5.02 6.78 
Brazil 100 100 
Source: INAMPS/Secretaria de Planejamento / DIS – 1987 
Decree - Law 99,060, issued on March 7, 1990, is regarded as an important step 
towards the implementation of the universalization of healthcare. Under this law, the 
Brazilian government decided that INAMPS was no longer bound to the Ministry of 
Social Security and that its administration should be transferred to the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Health.74 This act was an important transition for the implementation of 
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the system that would become the organ responsible for the institutionalization of health 
as a social right in practical terms. Six months after issuing Decree Law 99,060, the 
Brazilian government, under Collor´s administration, enacted Decree Law 8,080, 
creating the Sistema Unico de Saúde (SUS) that is in effect to this day. Article V 
established the objectives for this new autarchy: 
 
I - a identificação e divulgação dos fatores condicionantes e determinantes da 
saúde; II - a formulação de política de saúde destinada a promover, nos campos 
econômico e social, a observância do disposto no § 1º do art. 2º desta lei; III - a 
assistência às pessoas por intermédio de ações de promoção, proteção e 
recuperação da saúde, com a realização integrada das ações assistenciais e das 
atividades preventivas.75 
 
 The Sistema Único de Saúde was created with the purpose of putting into effect 
the mandates laid out in the Constitution and to provide medical aid to all citizens 
regardless of their socio-economic status. Article IX of the same law described the 
structure of this system and the respective organs that would hold authority and 
responsibility at the federal, state, and municipal levels: “ I - no âmbito da União, pelo 
Ministério da Saúde;II - no âmbito dos Estados e do Distrito Federal, pela respectiva 
Secretaria de Saúde ou órgão equivalente; e III - no âmbito dos Municípios, pela 
respectiva Secretaria de Saúde ou órgão equivalente”.76 At first, the SUS, instead of 
replacing INAMPS, it simply incorporated this organization into its structure and 
                                                          
75 “Decreto Lei 8,080. Art. V” www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l8080.htm 
 I -The identification and promotion of determining and factors concerning the area of health. II – The 
formulation of a health policy designed to promote, in the economic and social spheres, in accordance to 
article 2, III- The assistance of people through the mediation of actions targeted to promote and protect 
the area of health though the integrated implementation of assistance actions and preventive activities. 
(Law 8,080, article 9) Author´s translation. 
 
76 Art. IX, www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l8080.htm.  
At federal level through the Ministry of Health, at state and Federal District through the Health Secretary 
of Health or the corresponding agency, and III – at municipal level through the Secretary of Health of the 




adopted the logic of allocation of resources that were still mostly being derived from 
social security. Thus, the Brazilian government created a new entity but still relied on 
the old financial apparatus to put the new agency into motion. The goal of universal 
healthcare was attempted through the utilization of an organization designed to serve 
only a select part of the population.  
The unfeasibility of the dispositions enacted in the Constitution about the 
universalization of medical aid aroused heated debates among the more conservative 
political class. As we saw in the previous chapter, Sarney stated that the Constitution 
would make Brazil an ungovernable country but he was not the only politician to 
foresee that scenario. Roberto Jeferson , a deputy from the political coalition Centrão, 
during the constitutional process criticized the unbalanced relation between duty and the 
rights of the state and questioned the origin of funds to finance the universalization of 
medical aid “[...] saúde, direito de todos, dever do Estado; previdência, direito de todos, 
dever do Estado. Isto é bonito! Porém, isto é fazer reverência com o chapéu dos 
outros”.77 Jefferson referred to the absence of legal requirements ensuring incremental 
resources to expand medical aid to all citizens. In his analysis, the government intended 
to use the same resources that originally came from the contribution of twenty-seven 
million actively working citizens to a population of 160 million without adding new 
revenues. 
Being still financially tied to Social Security brought a series of complications to 
the federal government. Since the richest states were the largest contributors of social 
security funding, they also demanded that they should continue being the largest 
                                                          
 77 Ricardo Cesar Rocha Da Costa. "Descentralização, Financiamento E Regulação: A Reforma Do 
Sistema Público De Saúde No Brasil Durante a Década De 1990." Revista De Sociologia E Política, no. 
18 (2002):54.  
“…healthcare is a right of everyone, a duty of the State, social security, a right of everyone, a duty of the 
State, This is beautiful! Although, it is pleasing people at the expense of others.” Author´s translation. 
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recipients of medical aid funding. Given the fact that SUS did not establish its own 
separate source of funds, the reallocation of existing funds would result in the reduction 
of resources destined for the most developed regions, which led to serious political 
repercussions. The epitome of this fragile and complicated funding system occurred in 
May 1993 when Antonio Brito, the Minister of Social Security, withheld the resources 
that totaled 250 million reais that should be applied to the financing of SUS. The 
Ministry of Health was forced to resort to the Fundação de Amparo ao Trabalhador 
(FAT) to borrow funds to meet its obligations. The initial years of SUS were marked by 
the lack of a clear and independent source of funding. Despite its mission of providing 
universal healthcare, the evidence on healthcare spending demonstrated that, in effect, 
federal government expenditure on medical aid was diminished in the first two years of 
SUS´s existence.  
Table 6 displays how the Collor´s administration failed to allocate enough resources in 
the public healthcare system. 
 
TABLE 6 – Federal Spending on Healthcare in Brazil in the years 1989 – 1993. 




Federal Spending per 
Capita 
1989 11.320.3              -                  80.37 
1990 9,451.6            -16.5                  65.86 
1991 7,847            -16.9                  53.67 
1992 6,571.2            -16.3                  44.11 
1993 8,370.6           +26.4                  54.73 
Source: IPEA-IPLAN (Soares 1995, 253). 
As the numbers above illustrate, the government of Fernando Collor de Mello 
reduced spending on healthcare throughout his entire administration. If we compare the 
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expenditure from 1989 to the resources employed in healthcare in the last year of 
Collor’s administration (1992), we observe that federal spending per capita was reduced 
by approximately forty-five percent.78 Collor opted to ignore the constitutional norms 
that set the minimum expenditure on health care. His reluctance to comply with the new 
rules posed serious risks to the survival of the newly created SUS. Fagnani discusses the 
strategies adopted by Collor and their impacts on the health care system “No governo 
Collor, destaca-se o veto presidencial a 25 itens da Lei Orgânica de Saúde (LOS) 
aprovada pelo Congresso Nacional, a maior parte concentrada nos dispositivos sobre o 
financiamento do SUS, atingindo sua espinha dorsal”.79 Although the Constitution had 
already been approved when Collor took office, he exercised his veto power to obstruct 
the complementary legislation that defined how the legal precepts established in the 
Magna Carta would be carried out.  
However, Collor´s lack of commitment to an engaged social agenda, would not 
span the four years for which he had been elected. An array of accusations of corruption 
that inflicted not only his political cabinet, but bespoken the direct involvement of the 
Brazilian president with illicit practices, deprived Collor of any political credibility to 
run the country.  
3.4 - Itamar Franco Becomes the President. 
On December 29, 1992, Collor sent a handwritten letter of resignation to the 
Brazilian Senate. His resignation was the last resort by Collor to avoid his impeachment 
that was being voted on that day.80 If the Senate accepted his resignation and did not 
                                                          
78 Only during the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso would Brazil surpass the federal spending 
from 1989. 
 
79 Eduardo Fagnani,. “Política Social e Pactos Conservadores No Brasil: 1964/92.” Economia e 
Sociedade, no. 8( June 1997): 227. 
80 Collor De Mello, December 17, 1989, 
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/livrariadafolha/ult10082u663027.shtml 
 The letter written by Collor had the following content: “Renuncio ao mandato de presidente da 
República, para o qual fui eleito nos pleitos de 15 de novembro e 17 de dezembro de 1989”. 
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move forward with the impeachment process, Collor believed that his eligibility to run 
for political office would not be revoked.81 However, his action did not produce the 
desired result, as illustrated on the front pages of newspapers Folha de SP and O Globo, 
“Senado mantém o julgamento apesar da renúncia de Collor; Itamar é empossado 
presidente”; Collor renuncia mas deve perder seus poderes politicos”. 82 It was under 
these circumstances, that the government of the first directly elected president after the 
military dictatorship, was replaced by the administration of a politician with very little 
notoriety in Brazilian politics – Itamar Franco. 
The day after Collor was ousted from the Brazilian presidency, Itamar Franco 
addressed the Brazilian nation for the first time as the new president. His first 
presidential speech reflected the tumultuous and precarious economic and political 
situation that he had inherited from Collor. Itamar Franco did not delineate his political 
agenda, nor commit to concrete and measurable goals in the economic and social areas. 
Franco addressed the issue of poverty in Brazil as a matter that should be approached 
and dealt with by civil society instead of placing the responsibility on the government: 
Não resolveremos a situação social no Brasil enquanto não formos capazes, 
todos nós, de olhar nos olhos de todos os brasileiros, crianças e velhos, das 
cidades e dos campos, e vê-los como vemos os nossos próprios filhos, os nossos 
próprios pais, os nossos próprios irmãos. 
Não podemos ver os mais pobres com a comiseração que se endereça aos 
miseráveis, mas com o sentimento de que estamos diante de pessoas humanas 
iguais a nós, companheiras de nosso destino dentro dessas mesmas paisagens, 
sob este mesmo céu, e nessa mesma história.  A nossa sobrevivência como 
Nação depende da união de todos e do trabalho comum.83 
                                                          
 
81 The newspaper O Estadão speculated that Collor had aspirations to run for the position of mayor of São 
Paulo in the elections that would be held two years after his dismissal. However, his return to the political 
arena would occurred only in 2006, being elected a Senator for his home state Alagoas. He would be 
reelected as a member of the Senate in 2014. Collor contemplated the option of running for the Brazilian 
presidency in the upcoming elections of 2018. Albeit, after finding minimal support for his campaign, he 
decided to withdraw his candidacy. 
 
82 “Senado Mantém o Julgamento Apesar da Renúncia de Collor” Folha de São Paulo, December 30, 
1992. 
“ Collor Renuncia Mas Deve Perder Seus Direitos Políticos” O Globo, December 30, 1992 




The words above were his complete reference to the issue of poverty and 
inequality in Brazil. No promises or strategies that would be adopted by the government 
to improve the lives of the needy were laid out. Franco adopted a rhetoric that made the 
conundrum of the enormous poor population a problem not only pertinent to the 
government, but to the entire Brazilian society. Franco mentioned the poor economic 
performance in the government of Fernando Collor de Mello that had reduced GDP per 
capita by close to ten percent in his almost three years in the presidency.84 Furthermore, 
Franco discussed the unsustainable maintenance of the exorbitant interest rates that 
drained the federal finances. The explanation of the poor economic performance of 
Fernando Collor´s administration indicated that the new government was foreseeing a 
period of constrained public spending and therefore, investments in social programs 
could be expected to be diminished.  
3.5 -Government and Society United to Fight Hunger – Ação da Cidadania 
Contra a Fome, Miséria e pela Vida. 
Itamar Franco´s call on the civil society to fight poverty was personified in the 
figure of Herbert de Souza. Betinho, as he was best known by Brazilians, became the 
national figure that symbolized the symbiotic relationship between government and 
civil society that Franco hoped for in his inaugural speech. On March 8, 1993, Betinho 
                                                          
www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/itamar-franco/discursos/discurso-de-
posse/pronunciamento/view.  
 “We will not solve the social situation of Brazil as long we are not capable to look in the eyes of all 
Brazilians, children and elderly, from the urban and rural areas, and see them as our own sons, own 
fathers, and own brothers. We no longer may see the poor with the sorrow attitude addressed to miserable 
people, but with the sentiment that we stand before human beings just like us. Brothers that share the 
same destiny who inhabit the same landscapes, the same sky, and the history. Our survival as a nation, 
relies on our union and on our collective efforts”. Author´s translation. 
 
84 In 1990 the GDP of Brazil faced a retraction of 4,3%, in the next year it increased by 1% and it 
decreased again in 1992 by 0,5%. For a detailed account of the economic indicators of the Brazilian 




created the institution Ação da Cidadania Contra a Fome, Miséria e pela Vida that had 
as its mission to provide assistance to the thirty-two million citizens that were below the 
poverty line.85 In the same month, Itamar supported the Política de Segurança 
Alimentar, a plan presented to him by Luis Ignácio Lula da Silva, by then the president 
of Partido dos Trabalhadores that aimed to improve nutrition in poor areas. A national 
campaign to fight hunger gathered substantial support from the population and 
culminated in the development of the governmental Plano do Combate a Fome e a 
Miséria. Betinho was chosen to head this social plan. The choice of someone not 
affiliated with the government to be the main leader of this scheme represented the 
partnership between government and civil society towards the goal of fighting hunger 
and extreme poverty.  
Itamar through the enactment of Decree 807/93 created the Conselho Nacional 
de Segurança Alimentar (CONSEA), on 22 April, 1993.86 This autarchy was composed 
of nine ministers and twenty-one representatives from the civil society that would be 
appointed directly by the president. Its main attribution was to assist the government to 
implement actions and formulate proposals designed to improve nutrition in the country 
(Guedes de Vasconcelos 2005).87 Itamar saw the opportunity to capitalize on the public 
outcry to fight poverty and unite government and society and public and private funds 
                                                          
85 The Instituto de Pesquisa Aplicada (IPEA) developed a study titled O Mapa da Fome in 1993. This 
study highlighted the causes of hunger and poverty in Brazil and the geographic divisions within Brazil 
that showed an acute inequality of resources distributed through the country. For the entire first volume of 
this report see 
“O Mapa da Fome no Brasil” (1993), http://ipea.gov.br/agencia/images/stories/PDFs/o-mapa-da-fome-
vol1.pdf 
 
86 For the entire decree see:  
“Decreto 807/93”,22 April 1993, https://presrepublica.jusbrasil.com.br/legislacao/113260/decreto-807-93 
 
87 Guedes de Vasconcelos and Francisco de Assis. “Combate à Fome No Brasil:  
Uma Análise Histórica De Vargas a Lula Fighting Hunger in Brazil: a Historical Analysis from Presidents 




to improve the social condition of the Brazilian society. Betinho´s organization had 
been able to set up over five-thousand Comitês de Combate a Fome across the nation. 
His nationwide campaign against poverty gained the support of Brazilian celebrities and 
was nationally publicized in the media. The government took advantage of the favorable 
momentum of the Acão da Cidadania and through joint operations developed social 
actions that made use of the infrastructure created by Betinho´s organization.  
 Betinho believed that the fight against poverty had to follow a dual approach: it 
needed to develop emergency actions since the poor were starving and could not wait 
any longer to be properly fed, but it also needed to advance sustainable and long-term 
goals, otherwise the needy would never rise above their precarious conditions: 
A luta contra a miséria tem dupla dimensão, a emergencial e a estrutural. A 
articulação entre estas duas dimensões é complexa e cheia de astúcia. Atuar no 
emergencial sem considerar o estrutural é contribuir para perpetuar a miséria. 
Propor o estrutural sem atuar no emergencial é praticar o cinismo de curto prazo 
em nome da filantropia de longo prazo 88 
 
The aspirations of Betinho were not fully completed. The advancements of the 
partnership between the government and civil society institutionalized through, 
CONSEA and Ação da Cidadania respectively, produced relevant results in emergency 
actions, but the same could not be said about structural changes in the Brazilian social 
network. The unstable and insufficient flow of resources, along with a prevalence of 
unfounded economic precepts over social progress, exposed the fragility of the social 
fabric in Brazil. Without the support of the federal government, the long-term plans and 
structural changes that Betinho’s organization intended to carry out in Brazil were at 
                                                          
 88 “Notícias.” Ação Da Cidadania, www.acaodacidadania.com.br/?page=noticias&id=100.  
 “The fight against extreme poverty has double dimension, emergency and structural actions. The 
articulation between the two dimensions is complex and filled with craftiness. To focus on the emergency 
actions without taking into account structural actions is to contribute to perpetuate extreme poverty. To 
propose structural measures without also tackling emergency situations is to practice short-term cynicism 




risk. The large popularity that his organization gathered amidst civil society was not 
long-lasting and by 1995, although the organization was still operational, it did not 
enjoy the same support and financial resources as in 1993.  
3.6 -Lei Orgânica de Assistência Social 
 The main goal of the Lei Orgânica de Assistência Social (LOAS) was to provide 
a regulatory framework to the provisions established in the articles 203 and 204 of the 
Brazilian Constitution.89 The enactment of Law 8,742 on December 7, 1993, by Itamar 
Franco is considered one of the most important legacies of Itamar´s government to the 
social structure of Brazil. The process of enacting an organic law started in 1989 with 
the draft Law 3099/89 by Assemblyman Raimundo Bezerra. After undergoing all 
democratic and legal procedures, along with modifications in the original document, the 
Senate finally approved it in May 1990.90 Notwithstanding, in September of the same 
year, Collor through his Message to the Senate 672/85 stated that the LOAS was not 
based on a sustainable and viable social assistance structure. Fernando Collor decided to 
veto the LOAS in its entirety: 
Entre as razões ponderáveis que justificam o veto, sobressai a da existência, na 
proposição, de dispositivos contrários aos princípios de uma assistência social 
responsável, que se limite a auxílios ás camadas mais carentes da população, 
                                                          
89 Brazil Const. Art.203  
“A assistência social será prestada a quem dela necessitar, independentemente da contribuição a 
seguridade social, e tem por objetivos: I – a proteção da família, a maternidade, a infância, a adolescência, 
e a velhice. II – o amparo as crianças e adolescentes carentes, III –a promoção da integração ao mercado 
de trabalho, IV – a habilitação e reabilitação das pessoas portadoras de deficiência e a promoção da sua 
integração a vida comunitária, V- a garantia de um salário mínimo de benefício mensal a pessoa portadora 
de deficiência e ao idoso que comprovem meios de prover a própria manutenção ou de tê-la provida por 
sua família, conforme dispuser a lei. 
Art. 204” As ações governamentais na área da assistência social serão realizadas com recursos do 
orçamento da seguridade social, previstos no art. 195, além de outras fontes, e organizadas com base nas 
seguintes diretrizes: Lei número 8,742 and 8,069. 
90 For a full description on the process of implementation of a regulatory framework for the social  
assistance structure see:  
Eni Maria Monteiro Barbosa, “O Processo de Regulamentação da Assistência Social: Avanços e 




sem contudo, comprometer-se com a complementação pecuniária e continuada 
de renda.91 
 
The words expressed by Collor illustrated the reluctance of the federal government to 
abide by the predispositions of the new Constitution. In 1987, Sarney had stated that it 
would make the country ungovernable. Now three years later, Collor was vetoing legal 
predispositions that would make the government more accountable in efforts to provide 
the social assistance granted to all citizens by the Brazilian Constitution.  
The LOAS instituted the principles, objectives and the general guidelines of 
social policies. It also set the organizational structure and the administration of its 
policies, resources, benefits, and programs concerning social assistance. It is in its 
dispositions that we might begin to detect traces of the concept of implementing a 
federal cash-transfer system in Brazil. Article twenty of the LOAS describes the 
Benefícios de Prestação Continuada (BPC). Unlike other federal benefits that were 
funded by Social Security and covered only the formal working class, the BPC 
determined that any citizen with disabilities and elderly people over the age of sixty-five 
years old who can prove the lack of financial resources either by him/her or by his/her 
family were entitled to one monthly minimum-salary. The government defined a 
disabled person eligible for the benefit as one who has any long-term physical, mental, 
intellectual, or sensorial impediments that prevent them from performing his/her full 
societal participation on an equal basis with other citizens. The classification of the 
other group, the elderly with limited financial resources, was the target of criticism by 
the advocates of stronger and more encompassing social policies. By establishing the 
eligibility for the benefit, households with income below one - quarter of the minimum-
                                                          
91 Among the reasonable reasons that justify the veto, it stands out the existence, in the given proposition, 
of legal devices that go against the principles of a responsible social assistance. Such assistance should be 
restricted to the lower layers of the needy population. However, such assistance should not be undergone 




salary, the government targeted only the extremely poor. This was seen as a strategy to 
avoid the establishment of a minimum income for all citizens, an idea that was 
gathering some attention in the political scene.92 
 Former Brazilian Senator Eduardo Suplicy had a pioneering role in the 
promotion of this idea. He describes his actions towards the implementation of the 
Programa de Garantia de Renda Minima (PGRM): 
Em 1991, durante um debate entre cerca de 50 economistas com afinidades com 
o PT, organizado em Belo Horizonte, onde, a convite de Walter Barelli, Antonio 
Maria da Silveira e eu apresentamos a proposta do PGRM, o professor José 
Márcio Camargo da PUC-RJ observou que a garantia de uma renda mínima era 
um bom passo, mas que deveria ser dada a famílias necessitadas, com filhos em 
idade escolar que frequentassem a escola com regularidade. Dessa forma, não 
seriam forçados a trabalhar mais cedo a fim de ajudar na subsistência da 
família.93 
 
Suplicy attributes the debates on determining a universal minimum income that 
occurred in 1991 as influential to the development of the regional versions of the cash 
transfer program Bolsa Escola that were put into action in the municipality of Campinas 
– SP and in the Federal District in 1995. 
Although the disposition of LOAS did not provide the extension of benefits to 
the large portion of the needy population, it was seen as an advancement in comparison 
to the previous regulation. After the enactment of this law, the same aid provided to the 
handicapped and the elderly was transferred from the sphere of responsibility of Social 
Security to the direct responsibility of the social assistance structure. The 
disentanglement of social assistance and social security was a long process that made 
significant progress after the enactment of LOAS. The most substantial criticism of this 
                                                          
92 The idea of providing a basic income to all citizens has been widely discussed. For more information 
on this concept please see the website of the organization BIEN – Basic Income Earth Network 
http://basicincome.org/ 
 
93 Eduardo Matarazzo Suplicy and Cristovam Buarque. “Garantia De Renda Mínima Para Erradicar a 




social policy was its strict targeting. In order to be more inclusive, benefits had to be 
extended to households with income higher than one-quarter of a monthly minimum 
salary. The Departmento Intersindical de Estatistica e Estudos Socioeconomicos 
(DIEESE) had conducted a study that estimated that in order to have a dignified life, 
with all basic needs provided to workers and their families, they should earn at least six 
monthly minimum salaries.94 In 1989 it was also estimated that 63 percent of all 
Brazilian households earned below that income, thus, a large part of the Brazilian 
population that should be granted some sort of social assistance was not being assisted 
by the government. 
3.7 - Conclusion: 
During his inaugural speech, Fernando Collor de Mello demonstrated the lack of 
a clear and cohesive social policy agenda. Although he attempted to detach his 
government from the previous political rhetoric that aligned social improvement with an 
increase in economic outputs, his actions bespoke the disengagement between his 
speech and his policies. Collor stated that the issue of poverty and inequality would not 
be at the hands of the market, indicating a strong presence of the government to deal 
with these two dilemmas of the Brazilian society. However, his government eschewed 
commitment to passing forward regulations that would make it more accountable to the 
development of a federal government more accountable to provide more encompassing 
and efficient social assistance to its citizens. The ambiguity of his inaugural speech set 
the tone of his government. Although it is difficult to contend that his ambiguous 
actions and political rhetoric were intended to bewilder his constituents, or were the 
                                                          
94 DIEESE issues every year a report that takes into account prices of main services and products that are 
consumed by the average household, and calculates the differences between the current value and what 
should be the “ideal” salary. In its latest report, DIEESE, stated that the salary of July 2018 of R$954 
reais, in order to prove a dignifying standard of living should be increased by almost fourfold, amounting 




product of a disoriented and unmoored government, we can affirm that after his 
government, the Brazilian social apparatus faced an even more precarious situation. 
Instead of concentrating efforts to create legal instruments to put into practice the goals 
envisaged by the Constitution, Collor exerted his political authority to deter such 
regulations. The integral veto of the Lei Orgânica de Assistência Social demonstrates 
his lack of commitment to the implementation of the universalization of education and 
medical aid foreseen in the Constitution. 
The creation of the Ministério da Ação Social with its heterogeneous 
responsibilities, ranging from civil defense to social assistance, corroborate the 
observation that Collor´s government approached social assistance as a malleable 
concept. By not defining an intelligible and comprehensible social structure, the 
Ministério da Ação Social fragmented actions and social programs through ad hoc 
policies that provided benefits without clear regulations or long-term plans. 
Furthermore, MAS, very likely intentionally, failed to enforce mechanisms to ensure the 
proficient allocation of its resources. Its programs did not undergo a strict control on 
their expenditures, nor a measurement of their effectiveness by external or 
governmental regulating agencies.  Also, instead of relying on technical expertise to 
determine how benefits would reach the needy, his government, in many instances, 
allowed political criteria to determine the recipients of governmental assistance. 
Fernando Collor employed social programs for clientelistic practices, and to bolster 
political support. The cases of the distribution of food baskets to households of low 
income and the provision of water to areas that suffered severe cases of drought, were 
illustrative of this strategy.  
The misuse of public money in the Legião Brasileira de Assistência was part of 
a larger corruption scheme that infected his government and ultimately caused his 
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impeachment. It is challenging to assess precisely the damage of corruption with 
regards to the improvement of the social structure of the country. To measure the impact 
of not receiving a food basket or being deprived of water, might be quantitatively 
convoluted. Nonetheless, it is overt to affirm that, had the funds be applied with the sole 
goal of bettering poor people´s lives and reducing income inequality, they would have 
produced superior results. Also, the extensive adoption of nepotism in the organization 
prevented the government from putting in place an agency with competent and 
knowledgeable personnel. 
Arguably the most relevant event for the social structure of Brazil that occurred 
in his government was the implementation of the Sistema Unico de Saude (SUS). 
Notwithstanding, the implementation of a federal health system had already been 
created through legislation when Collor took office, thus this achievement cannot be 
credited as one of the accomplishments of his government. In fact, Collor was reluctant 
to abide by the dispositions of the SUS, as his veto to twenty-five items of the Lei 
Orgânica da Saude, many of them concerning how the SUS would be financed, 
demonstrate. His actions put the survival of the newly established federal health system 
at risk. The numbers of federal spending on health care during his government show 
that investments on medical aid decreased by almost fifty percent throughout his 
administration.  
Collor´s contribution to the political process that culminated in the first federal 
cash-transfer program in Brazilian history seemed to be minimal. Despite his inaugural 
presidential speech where he stated that the poor would not be at the mercy of the 
market and that economic growth did not translate into better social conditions, his 
actions did little to improve the social conditions of the country. We could not identify 
any concrete attempts to implement any type of redistributive social policy that 
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provided the poor with assistance in the form of financial aid. Instead of representing a 
stepping stone to the materialization of Bolsa Escola that occurred in 2001, we are 
closer to affirm that his government represented a step backward. The misappropriation 
of public funds, absence of a clear social policy agenda, and lack of governmental 
commitment to constitutional social rights, are some of the evidence that supports the 
argument that his government failed to ameliorate the conditions of needy Brazilians. 
The failure of Collor was such that once his vice-president took office, Itamar 
Franco immediately attempted to disassociate his image from that of the impeached 
president. Franco was aware of the chaotic economic situation of Brazil´s public 
accounts when he imposed a drastic cut in the federal budget. Franco opted to adopt a 
more cautious political narrative in his first speech as the new head of the government 
and shared the responsibility of fighting poverty with the entire Brazilian community.  
Franco´s strategy could be seen simply as an intelligent way of diminishing the state´s 
responsibility and place part of the accountability for the high levels of poverty on the 
civil society. However, it resonated with a substantial portion of the population and, 
particularly through the organization created by Betinho, Ação da Cidadania Contra a 
Fome, a Miséria e a pela Vida, he gathered ample support and produced relevant 
outcomes in emergency actions to fight poverty.  
 Unfortunately, the cooperation between the government and society with public 
and private funds proved to be an ephemeral success. The association of public and 
private sectors failed to execute structural changes that would produce long-lasting 
actions to fight poverty. The concern of Betinho that the sole strategy of acting on 
emergency actions without taking into account structural measures would signify the 
perpetuation of misery proved to be legitimate. Franco´s government demonstrated that 
in order to implement enduring and effective social programs, a steady and well-defined 
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source of funds needed to be determined. His government maintained that the role of 
civil society needs to be of a complementary nature. It is the government that needs to 
delineate the continuous flow of resources for social programs that aim to move people 
out of poverty.  
 Whereas Franco´s efforts to unite government and civil society to fight poverty 
might not have resulted in efficient and consistent structural changes, it was under his 
rule that Brazil enacted of one of the most important laws in the history of its social 
network. The Lei Orgânica de Assistência Social had been previously vetoed by Collor 
in 1990. It was under Franco´s government that the law was enacted that set the 
organizational structure of the policies, resources, benefits, and programs that concerned 
social assistance.  
 LOAS is of utmost importance for this research since it is in its provisions that 
we can arguably detect the first signs of the concept of introducing a national cash-
transfer program in Brazil. The Benefícios de Prestação Continuada (BPC) granted to 
citizens with disabilities and people over sixty-five years of age one monthly minimum 
salary. Albeit still restrictive in its scope, this action represented a conceptual shift in 
the political will to provide social assistance. Subsequent to LOAS, this type of benefit 
would no longer be tied to funds from Social Security which benefited only the formal 
working class. Placing the financial responsibility with the newly created social 
assistance structure, widened the targeted group to anyone who met the criteria, 
detaching this benefit from funds coming exclusively from social security. Also, the 
government conditioned its benefits only to the elderly citizens belonging to households 
with income lower than a quarter of the minimum-salary. At the time, it was believed 
that this strategy was adopted to avoid the establishment of a minimum universal 
income, an idea that was achieving increasing support. The political debate discussing 
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the target groups that should benefit from financial assistance by the federal government 
is another piece of evidence that the concept of cash transfer programs was becoming 


























Fernando Henrique Cardoso –The Father of the Plano Real Succeeds Itamar 
Franco. 
 
Perhaps no other Brazilian president bore a more substantial background for the 
goals of an improved social structure and a fairer distribution of wealth in the country. 
A sociologist by profession, being one of the originators of the dependency theory, 
expert on the intrinsic characteristics of the acute poverty and inequality of Brazil, 
Cardoso, had the qualifications to ensure that Brazil would enter a new era in its anti-
poverty policies.95 Albeit his marked socialist background, it was his economic 
achievements during his term, as finance minister for Itamar Franco that brought him to 
the highest office in the federal government. 96 Cardoso assembled a team of economists 
from the university PUC-RJ and designed an economic plan that had as its main task to 
halt the rampant inflation levels that had reached forty-four percent in the month 
previous to the implementation of the Plano Real.97 Cardoso’s economic policies were 
so successful that his popularity made him the natural candidate for the Brazilian 
                                                          
95 James F Hoge, “Fulfilling Brazil's Promise: A Conversation with President Cardoso.” Foreign Affairs, 
July 1995.  
 In this issue, Foreign Affairs interviewed Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who they described as “being 
called the most honest and best prepared president of Brazil in more than a generation… a former Marxist 
intellectual whose thinking has evolved from socialism to his current approach, which couples liberal, 
market-based economics, with strong anti-poverty measures. 
 
96 Gustavo Franco, one of the leading economists of this economic plan and former president of the 
Brazilian central bank, wrote an article titled “Real Plan” in 1996. In this research, he explains with 
details the rationale of the plan and the particularities that made it the first successful economic initiative 
to tackle inflation in a sustainable matter.  
 
97 Edmar Bacha, Pérsio Arida , Pedro Malan, André Lara Resende, Rubens Ricupero, and José Serra, all 
working under the supervision of Cardoso, are considered the mentors of the Real Plan. It is important to 
note that when first introduced to the political class and the International Monetary Fund, the Real Plan 
did not find substantial support. Accounts from the economic team also report that Itamar Franco was 
reluctant to approve a plan that did not include the freezing of prices. Fernando Henrique Cardoso in his 
book recalls the moments of the creation of the real plan. 





presidency.98 Cardoso capitalized on the triumph of his economic policies and embraced 
the continuation of his reforms as the main component of his presidential campaign. 
The cover of Folha de São Paulo from Cardoso´s inauguration day stated that seventy-
nine percent of the population supported the Real Plan.99 
Cardoso´s first presidential speech emphasized that his election implied approval 
by the Brazilian population of the achievements of the Plano Real and its important role 
to permanently eliminate the threat of high inflation, “… a maioria absoluta dos 
brasileiros, fez uma opção pela continuidade do Plano Real, e pelas reformas estruturais 
necessárias para afastar, de uma vez por todas o fantasma da inflação”. 100 Fernando 
Henrique, as he was known in Brazil, unlike his predecessors, was taking office under 
an economic scenario that envisaged a promising future. While the better economic 
setting allowed Cardoso a more harmonious beginning for his administration, it put 
more pressure on him to address how his government would approach the issue of 
poverty and inequality. As reviewed in this research, Sarney, Collor, and Franco 
centered their inaugural speeches on the challenge of engendering economic 
stabilization. The three presidents previous to Fernando Henrique approached social 
correction as a product of economic stabilization and growth. Cardoso established social 
justice as the main mission of his government, “Falta a justiça social. É este o grande 
desafio do Brasil nesse final de século. Será esse o objetivo número um do meu 
                                                          
98 Cardoso was elected in the first round with 54,24% of the votes. Luis Inacio Lula da Silva was the 
forerunner with 27,07% followed by Eneas Carneiro 7,38%, Orestes Quercia 4,38% , Leonel Brizola 
3,19%, and Esperidião Amin with  2,75%. The elevated numbers reached by the third candidate Eneas 
Carneiro were deemed as a protest vote, given the fact that very little was known about his political 
platform. For a detailed report on the election numbers see: http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/eleicoes-
anteriores/eleicoes-1994/resultados-das-eleicoes-1994/brasil 
 
99 “FHC Toma Posse; 79% Apóiam Real” Folha de São Paulo,( January1, 1995): 1. 
 





governo”. 101 Cardoso was aware of the misconception that equated economic growth 
with better widespread living conditions, and the results that this rationale had produced 
in his country. It is relevant to note the evolution of political discourse throughout the 
governments covered in this study. It is observable that the rhetoric that poverty had to 
be fought with economic development lost ground to the recognition that different 
alternatives to reduce poverty had to be elaborated. In the government of Franco, 
political discourse was centered on sharing this responsibility with the civil society. 
When Cardoso took office we observe the ultimate acknowledgement that the political 
will had to focus on the deployment of a strong social agenda. 
One of the issues analyzed in this research was how Federal spending on health 
care in the government of José Sarney resulted in the largest fraction of resources spent 
on curative versus preventive care. Cardoso expressed his concern with the area of 
medical aid in Brazil, and the importance to concentrate efforts on preventive care, 
“Mas a saúde tem que ser encarada – e assim vai ser no meu governo – principalmente 
como prevenção da doença, e não só a cura da doença. Um visão moderna da saúde, 
inclui saneamento básico, vacinação adequada, esporte para todos”.102 This statement by 
Cardoso is particularly relevant to this study. As will be demonstrated in the next 
chapter, the conditions of eligibility for the experiences with federal cash-transfer 
programs in Brazil included actions directed at preventive care.   
                                                          
101 Cardoso, Discurso Posse, 13. 
 “There is a lack of social justice in the country. This is the main challenge of Brazil in this end of 
century. This will be the number one goal of my government” (Cardoso 1994). Author´s translation. 
102 Ibid, 20  
The conundrum of healthcare needs to be faced – and this is how my government will proceed – 
principally in actions towards the prevention of diseases, instead of focusing on the cure of such illnesses. 
A modern vision on health includes basic sanitation, adequate vaccination, and sports for all” (Cardoso 




In the area of education, Cardoso emphasized reducing the number of illiterate 
and semi-illiterate that permeated the Brazilian society.103 According to him, in order to 
improve education in Brazil, it was necessary to implement measures that surpassed 
physical investments in the form of building new schools. Cardoso believed that Brazil 
had to undergo a cultural transformation in the perception of education by teachers and 
students. To ensure that students would have an insightful and knowledgeable 
experience through their periods as students was a fundamental premise to him “Chega 
de construir escolas faraônicas e depois enchê-las de professores mal pagos e mal 
preparados, juntamente com estudantes desmotivados e sem condições materiais e 
psicológicas para terem um bom aproveitamento”.104 As in the case of measures of 
preventive care, Cardoso also capitalized on the development of Bolsa Escola to devise 
dispositions that would ensure that children attended school in order to receive the 
program´s benefits. 
4.1 -Rede de Proteção Social 
The set of social policies and programs developed during the government of 
Cardoso was later termed the Rede de Proteção Social. Cardoso´s political party PSDB, 
issued a report in 2002 that delineated all the accomplishments of his eight years as the 
Brazilian president. In its section on the improvement of the social structure, it relates 
                                                          
103 The Brazilian Institute Geography and Statistics (IBGE) ascertained the levels of illiteracy in 1995 in 
the population of citizens of 15 years old or older as 15,5% For historic figures on this issue see 
https://ww2.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/condicaodevida/indicadoresminimos/notasindicadore
s.shtm 
For a more complete description of the figures and characteristics of the problem of illiteracy in Brazil see 
a report  elaborated by The Ministry of Education in 2003. available at  
“Mapa do Analfabetismo no Brasil”, 2013,  http://portal.inep.gov.br/informacao-da-publicacao/-
/asset_publisher/6JYIsGMAMkW1/document/id/485756 
  
104 Cardoso, Discurso Posse, 21. 
“We must stop building colossal schools, and fill them with poorly prepared and paid instructors, along 
with unmotivated students without the adequate psychological and material conditions in order to 




how the Rede de Proteção Social was able to develop twelve social programs that 
focused on the poorest group of Brazilian citizens. 105 
Table 7 lists the seven programs that were non-contributory (not tied to the 
social security system) and their respective targets, volume of resources, and the number 
of beneficiaries. The federal government provided a more encompassing table with 
twelve programs that formed the entire set of social actions of the Rede de Proteção 
Social. This research intentionally did not include the programs Seguro Desemprego, 
Seguro Safra, Aposentadoria e Pensões Rurais, and Bolsa Qualificação, because they 









                                                          
105 It is important to note the Fernando Henrique Cardoso implemented the Fundo de Combate a Pobreza 
in 2000 through a Constitutional Amendment. This piece of legislation was promulgated in December 
2000 and established the funds to combat poverty would derive from a percentage of the CPMF – 
Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimentações Financeiras. This tax had been temporarily instituted and 
became a target of criticism since it taxed all financial transactions. The government determined that 
,08% of this tariff would be used to fund the Fundo de Combate a Pobreza that became the responsible 
organ for the Rede de Proteção Social created by Fernando Henrique Cardoso. For the full content of this 
Constitutional amendment see: 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/emendas/emc/emc31.htm 
For more information on Cardoso´s strategies to develop Rede de Proteção Social see:  
Sônia Draibe, "A Política Social No Período FHC E O Sistema De Proteção Social." Tempo Social 15, 
no.2 (2003): 63-101. 
106 All monetary values were brought to present terms in the Brazilian currency through the Brazilian 
Central Bank system and then converted to dollars according to the exchange rate from 03/28/2018. To 





Table 7: Non-Contributory Programs of Rede de Proteção Social: 2002 




Bolsa Alimentação Children up to 6 years old, pregnant 
women, mothers breastfeeding infants 
up to 6 months old, from households 
with income per capita up to half 
minimum salary. 
US$ 14 per 
children. Limit of 







Children between the ages 7 – 15 
involved with insalubrious or 
degrading labor, from households with 
income per capita up to half minimum 
salary 
US$ 23 per 
children in rural 
areas and US$ 37 
in urban areas 
810,769 
Bolsa Escola Children between the ages 6– 15, from 
households with income per capita up 
to half minimum salary 
US$ 14 per child. 




Auxílio Gás Families of low income US$ 7 per family 
per month. 
8,108,758 
Brasil Jovem Youth between the ages of 15-17 years 
old from household with income per 
capita up to half minimum salary 




Elderly people over 67 years old and 
handicapped with income lower than 
one-quarter of the minimum salary  
One minimum 
salary 




Elderly people over 70 years old, or 
disabled who can prove the lack of 











Although a complete and detailed analysis of the entire set of the social 
programs comprised in the Rede de Proteção Social could provide us with a more 
thorough picture of the social achievements of Cardoso´s government, it is beyond the 
scope of this research. One of the criticisms of his government is the fact that, despite 
his resolution to place the quest for social justice as the first priority of his government, 
it was only in his second term in office (1999-2002) that we can observe the 
development of robust and encompassing social programs. For example, the programs 
Auxílio Gás and Bolsa Alimentação, although relevant to analyze the impact on poverty 
reduction in Brazil in the first decade of the 21st century, were subsequent to the 
program Bolsa Escola, therefore not inclusive in the timeframe of this research. Other 
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programs such as the Benefício de Prestação Continuada and the Renda Mensal 
Vitalícia had been established by previous governments and were simply kept in place 
during his administration. For the reasons previously mentioned, the remainder of this 
research will be focusing only on examining the impacts of the Programa de 
Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (PETI) and the ultimate target of this research, the 
first federal cash-transfer in Brazilian history, Bolsa Escola. 
 
4.2- Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil 
In a joint effort with the International Labor Organization, the Brazilian 
government launched in 1996 the Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil 
(PETI). The purpose of this initiative was to eradicate child labor and return youth to 
the classroom by giving cash incentives to their families. The conditions to be eligible 
for the program were to be between 7 and 15 years old and belong to households of 
income lower than half the minimum salary per capita. Beneficiaries would receive a 
cash incentive equivalent to twenty-three dollars at present value for families in rural 
areas and thirty-seven dollars to households in urban areas. 107 The condition imposed 
on the recipients of the benefits was that the children would have to attend regular 
classes and extra-curricular activities promoted by their school. The money would 
primarily be given to the mothers, a feature also followed in the subsequent cash-
transfer programs.108 Also, the state was responsible to provide the cash benefit along 
                                                          
107 The Institute of Applied Research (IPEA) produced an assessment of the strides that Brazil had 
reached towards to eradication of child labor. This study concluded that the main reasons for the sharp 
decline in the employment of child labor since the 1990´s is mainly due to the deployment of PETI and 
the subsequent cash-transfer programs that applied minimum school attendance records in their 
conditionalities. 
Paes de Barros and Rosane Mendonça. “Trabalho Infantil no Brasil Rumo à Erradicação”Ideas Working 
Paper (August 2010): 3-28.  
 
108 The Mexican version of cash-transfer program, was first called Progresa (1997), renamed 
Oportunidades in 2002, and switched names again in 2014 to the current denomination Prospera as of 
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with the transfer of resources to municipalities to help them promote extracurricular 
activities in sports, leisure, culture, and other areas. Each municipality would receive the 
amount of eighteen dollars per student in rural areas, while schools in urban areas would 
be eligible for half of this amount. 
Brazil has a long history of employment of children in its workforce. Child labor 
became legally restricted in Brazil only with the advent of the Constitution of 1934. Its 
Article 121 enacted the prohibition of any labor activities of individuals under fourteen 
years old, night shifts for people under sixteen years old, and employment in hazardous 
industries for people under eighteen years old and women of all ages. 109 Whereas the 
Constitution of 1937 did not make any changes in this provision, the Magna Carta from 
1946 raised the minimum age to work night shifts to eighteen years old.110 Nonetheless, 
the Constitution of 1967, devised under military rule represented a retrograde step to the 
rights acquired in the previous legislation. The government lowered the minimum age to 
perform any labor activity from fourteen to only twelve years old. Additionally, the 
military government deregulated the provision that established the unlawfulness of 
unequal pay based on age. Thus, the military government, besides allowing employment 
                                                          
2018. For a full description of the program, see the research published by the Inter-American 
Development Bank and elaborated by Laura G. Dávila Lárraga. 
Laura Davila Larraga, “How Does Prospera Work? Best Practices in the Implementation of Cash-
Transfer Programs in Latin America and the Caribbean” IADB (2016): 1-94. 
 
109 For a full description of the article 121 see 




110 Bernardo Leôncio Moura Coelho, “A Proteção à Criança Nas Constituições Brasileiras: 1824 a 1969.” 
Revista De Informação Legislativa, vol. 35, no. 139 ( July 1998): 93–108.  
 Bernardo Leôncio Moura Coelho reviewed the Brazilian constitutions from 1824 – 1969 and their 
prerogatives regarding the legal employment of children. He points out that the Constitution of 1946 was 
influenced by the conventions of the International Labor Organization organized in 1920, 1921, 1932, and 




of citizens over the age of twelve, also permitted that they were more poorly 
compensated than the adult workforce.111 
It is in the formulation of the Constitution of 1988 that the rights of children 
attracted wider political and social support. Article 227 established the duties of the 
family, society, and the state to ensure the rights to life, health, food, education, leisure, 
professionalization, culture, dignity, respect, freedom, and family and community 
interaction.112  In 1990, Brazil enacted Law 8.069. This measure shaped the regulations 
that would guarantee the rights of children and adolescents stipulated in the new 
Constitution. The set of regulations delineated in this law became known as the Estatuto 
da Criança e do Adolescente (ECA). Despite the legal protection brought about by the 
new Constitution and the ECA, the reality was that the numbers of participant children 
in the Brazilian workforce were still staggering. The fact that many families relied on 
the labor of their children for their subsistence called for further actions to eradicate 
child labor.  
Table 8 presents the evolution of the number of children and adolescents 





                                                          
111 Brazil, Const, 1967. Art. 158  “A Constituição assegura aos trabalhadores os seguintes direitos, além 
de outros que, nos termos da lei, visem à melhoria, de sua condição social: X - proibição de trabalho a 
menores de doze anos e de trabalho noturno a menores de dezoito anos, em indústrias insalubres a estes e 
às mulheres”. 
 
112 Brazil, Const, 1988, Art. 227 
 “É dever da família, da sociedade e do Estado assegurar à criança, ao adolescente e ao jovem, com 
absoluta prioridade, o direito à vida, à saúde, à alimentação, à educação, ao lazer, à profissionalização, à 
cultura, à dignidade, ao respeito, à liberdade e à convivência familiar e comunitária, além de colocá-los a 




  1992            2008 








5 – 9 years 4 690 1 157 
5 – 14 years 13 4,665 5 1,655 
5 – 15 years 16 6,046 7 2,475 
10 – 13 years 19 2,716 7 954 
10 – 14 years 22 3,938 9 1,499 
10 – 15 years 26 5,436 11 2,319 




As the figures from Table 8 show, despite the minimum age for work eligibility 
being set at sixteen by the Constitution and the ECA, forty percent of adolescents 
between the ages of 14 and 15 were still engaged in employment two years after the 
implementation of ECA. Perhaps even more striking was the statistic reporting that 
690,000 children between 5 and 9 years old were active participants in the Brazilian 
workforce. A similar trend can be observed across all the other age ranges. No age 
group reduced its numbers by less than fifty percent over the sixteen-year period. It is 
perceptible the impact that cash-transfer programs that aimed to keep children in school 
had on the efforts to eradicate child labor. By 2008 the workforce participation of the 
same age groups had fallen by approximately seventy-seven percent in the case of 
children of ages from 5 to 9 years old and by half in the group of adolescents between 
14 and15 years old. A report issued by the federal government in 2002, estimated that 
the Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (PETI), had been able to place over 
eight-hundred thousand children back in school. According to this report, most of these 
 73 
 
children had been in workplace positions that did not contribute to their professional 
and cultural development.113 
 The PETI originated in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul focusing on the children 
working in the charcoal plants in that state. In its first year of operation, the program 
reached 1,500 children dispersed through fifteen municipalities. Throughout the years 
this social initiative expanded significantly, reaching all twenty-six states and the 
Federal District, totaling 810,769 children. Since the enforcement of the program relied 
on the effective cooperation of the federal government, states, and municipalities, 
priority was placed on the areas that relied heavily on the employment of child labor. 
For that reason, this program was more prevalent in rural and more remote areas than in 
the large Brazilian urban areas. The program differed from Bolsa Escola in scope since, 
in its conception, the purpose of it was to locate working children and give their 
families a cash-incentive to keep their children studying. The convolution of its 
network, where state authorities had to first identify the working children, notify 
families and employers on the illegality of this act, and only then process the benefit, 
made it difficult to reach nationwide proportions. In 2006 the Federal government 
incorporated its benefits under the most comprehensive cash-transfer program in 
Brazilian history – Bolsa Família.114 
                                                          
113 Brasil 1994-2002 - A Era Do Real - 2002. Secretaria De Estado De Comunicação Do Governo, 2002, 
pp. 1–468. 
This report signaled that most of these children performed labor activities in charcoal plants, orange 
plantations, sugarcane fields, and other activities enterprises centered on the exploitation of hard labor. 
 
114 Under the administration of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, Bolsa Família underwent a process of 
incorporation of other social programs under one encompassing social protection system. Provisional 
measure 132 from October 20, 2003, enacted that Bolsa Escola, Programa Nacional de Acesso a 
Alimentação, Programa Nacional de Renda Mínima, Bolsa Alimentação, and Auxílio Gás, were all 
unified into one single social program named Bolsa Família. For the entire content of this provisional 
measure see: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/mpv/Antigas_2003/132.htm 
PETI was later incorporated into the same program in 2006. For more information on the evolution of 
Bolsa Família see  
Rocha Sonia. “O programa Bolsa Família: evolução e efeitos sobre a pobreza”. Econ. Soc. Campinas vol. 




4.3 - Bolsa Escola – A Regional Cash-Transfer Experience  
 Cristovam Buarque was elected the governor of the Federal District in 1995. He 
was a former chancellor of the Universidade de Brasília (UNB) and an enthusiastic 
advocate of the use of education as the primary tool to fight intergenerational poverty. 
One of his first measures as governor was the promulgation of Decreto 16,270/95 that 
instituted the social program Bolsa Alimentação para a Educação. Buarque believed 
that the root of the precarious social condition of Brazil was the lack of education in the 
lower economic classes. He realized that an educational revolution could not be 
grounded only in the construction of new schools and better training and remuneration 
of teachers. Buarque understood that, in many instances, children of poor families did 
not attend school because their labor was critical to the subsistence of their families. 
The past history of Brazilian governments of neglecting the need to educate the poor 
created an implicit reasoning among the poor that education was a privilege of the 
wealthy. 
Buarque pointed out that the basic premise of his social program originated from 
a discussion with his political cabinet, “Ao buscar medidas concretas para colocar as 
crianças na escolar, fiz ao grupo a pergunta: se as crianças não estudam porque as 
famílias são pobres, porque não pagamos as famílias, para que as crianças estudem”.115  
Buarque concluded that it was crucial to detach the program from the concept of 
charity. He was convinced that instead of being bound to the Secretary of Social 
Assistance, Bolsa Educação had to be under the responsibility of the Secretary of 
                                                          
115 Buarque, Cristovam. Bolsa-Escola: história, Teoria e Utopia. Thesaurus Editora, 2012.  
 “When seeking concrete measures to ensure that children attended school, I inquired my political 
cabinet: if these children do not attend school because they belong to poor households, why do not we pay 




Education. The idea of giving money to poor families to keep their children in school 
was a novelty in Brazilian politics and was criticized as being a demagogue strategy by 
Buarque´s opponents during this political campaign.116 Bolsa Escola granted one 
monthly minimum salary to families that had all their children between the ages of 7 
and 14 enrolled in the public educational system. To be eligible for the cash benefits, 
the prerogatives of the program stipulated that household income could not exceed half 
the minimum salary per capita. 117An additional condition was that the students must 
maintain monthly attendance of at least ninety percent. In the case that a student missed 
more than two school days without appropriate justification, families would not be 
eligible to receive the benefit.  Furthermore, in case any adult family members were 
unemployed, he/she would have to be registered at the Sistema Nacional de Emprego 
(SINE) to prove the pursuit of work placement. In order to prevent a large internal 
migration to the Federal District from other states, Bolsa Escola also set the requirement 
of five years of local residency.  
The Instituto de Pesquisa Aplicada (IPEA) issued a report in 1998 to evaluate 
the first numbers presented by Bolsa Escola in the village of Paranoá, the first region to 
receive the benefits of the program. The report pointed out how the focus on families 
that had children between the ages of 7 and 14 enabled the government to reduce its 
target population by forty-seven percent. Had the eligibility for the program been based 
                                                          
116In his website, Buarque narrates how, at first, his idea was criticized by his political oponents “ainda 
durante a campanha eleitoral, a ideia foi criticada e tida como assistencialista e demagógica pelos meus 
adversários. Porém, quando os primeiros resultados apareceram, comprovou-se que, a Bolsa-Escola era 
uma forma simples, e de baixo custo, de trazer as crianças para as escolas, mantê-las em sala de aula e 





117 At present value taking into account the monthly minimum salary in June 2018 of approximately 258 
dollars, the financial requirement of Bolsa Escola amounted to total income household of only 129 
dollars. These numbers demonstrate the narrow scope of the program, being eligible only to families 
under extreme poverty. 
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strictly on the criterion of income, the government would have been required to provide 
the benefit to an additional 37,800 families.118 The same study illustrated the high 
correlation between poverty and low levels of education in the Federal District. Table 8 
shows the level of education of the applicants for the program who in most cases were 
either the father or the mother of the benefited students. 
Table 9 – Level of Education of Applicants- Bolsa Escola 
Level of Education Number of Cases Percentage  
Illiterate 694 26.4 
Can read and write 1,626 61.9 
Completed elementary school 273 10.4 
Completed high school 34 1.3 
Total 2,627 100 
Source: IBGE/PNAD, 1995, Bolsa Escola 
http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/2457/1/td_0582.pdf 
 
More than eighty-eight percent of the applicants had either no formal education, 
or very limited experience in the educational system, not being able to articulate beyond 
basic reading and writing skills. Only a little over one percent of the applicants were 
able to finish high school. This data indicated the relevance of breaking the 
intergenerational cycle of meager access to education by the poor. Moreover, the 
average income of the recipients provided further evidence that the government was on 
the right track to improve educational levels through the promotion of cash rewards. 
                                                          
118 João Sabóia and Sonia Rocha. Programas De Renda Mínima — Linhas Gerais De Uma Metodologia 




The government’s assertion that acute levels of poverty prevented youths from 
attending school is demonstrated by the low levels of income found among the 
participants of Bolsa Escola (table 9). 
Table 10 – Distribution of Applicant Income for Bolsa Escola 
Total Household Income 
Number of Cases Percentage 
Up to one minimum- salary 
630 24 
Between one and three minimum-
salaries 1825 69.5 
Between four and five minimum- 
salaries 134 5.1 




Source: IPEA: Programas de Renda Miníma – Linhas Gerais de Uma Metodologia a 
Partir da Experiência Pioneira do Paranoá, no Distrito Federal (1998, 17) 
Table 10 demonstrates that, although the benefit of Bolsa Escola was insufficient 
to provide a decent standard of living, for many families it represented a substantial 
component of their income. For twenty-four percent of the recipients of Bolsa Escola, 
the benefit was either equal to or superior to their household income. To almost the 
totality of the applicants, 93.5 percent, the benefit received by the program represented 
at least an increase of thirty percent in their earnings. 
Cardoso’s memoir, The Diaries of Presidency, demonstrates that the Federal 
government was paying close attention to the social program developed by Buarque. 
The third volume of his diaries cover the two years previous to the implementation of 
Bolsa Escola at the federal level in 1999-2000. Cardoso, in an entry from April 28, 
2000, relates the episode when the governor of the state of Mato Grosso inquired about 
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the possibility of trading the state´s debt with the federal union for resources to be 
applied in their Bolsa Escola program. Although Cardoso declined the offer, explaining 
that it would not be feasible to convert Mato Grosso´s debt into funding for Bolsa 
Escola, Cardoso expressed his admiration for Buarque´s program “A Bolsa Escola é 
uma coisa importante, e o governo, por outro caminho, deve dar recursos à Bolsa 
Escola, mas não trocando pela dívida, até porque a Bolsa Escola gasta muito pouco em 
comparação com o tamanho da dívida”.119 At this point Bolsa Escola had also been 
implemented by other states – Amapá, Mato Grosso do Sul, Alagoas, São Paulo, Minas 
Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Goiás, and Acre – which adopted Buarque´s ideas and instituted 
their regional Bolsa Escola programs. The wide support received by regional cash-
transfer programs demonstrated that a narrative of political will that supported the poor 
was feasible. Although the Constitution did not guarantee the maintenance of cash-
transfer, and this social policy relied on political will, contemporary developments in 
Brazil affirm how this initiative achieved high levels of political support. During the 
presidential elections of 2018, all candidates promised to keep the current program, 
Bolsa Familia and, in some cases, even expand its benefits. Many viewed the elected 
president Jair Bolsonaro as a threat to cash-transfer programs. However, Jair Bolsonaro, 
dispelled all doubts about the continuation of this social policy. Moreover, he promised 
to grant all beneficiaries a thirteenth salary, a benefit granted to all laborers working 
under the formal system.120 
                                                          
119 Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Diários Da presidência, Vol. 3: 1999-2000  Companhia Das Letras, 
2017), 114.  
 “Bolsa Escola is something of great importance, and the government has to provide resources to it, 
however this financial assistance should not be in the form of exchange for debts with the government, 
because Bolsa Escola requires much less investment than the debts of the states with the Union”. Author´s 
translation. 
 





4.4 -Programa de Garantía de Renda Familiar Mínima 
In the same year that Bolsa Escola had been implemented in Brasília, another 
regional cash-transfer program was being devised in the city of Campinas in the state of 
São Paulo. On January 6, 1995, Campinas´ mayor José Roberto Teixeira Magalhães 
enacted law 8261/95 instituting the Programa de Garantia de Renda Familiar Mínima. 
(PGRFM). 121 This program became the center of controversy in Brazil about the real 
origins of federal cash-transfer programs in Brazil. While, Bolsa Escola was created 
under an administration of the leftist political party Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), the 
Campinas´s program was the result of a government by PT´s rival party PSDB. Given 
the positive impacts of cash-transfer program in diminishing poverty once they were 
scaled to the federal level, both parties claim the intellectual and practical ownership of 
this social policy.122 
Teixeira Magalhães realized that the conventional policies of social assistance to 
fight poverty did not produce relevant results since they functioned only to alleviate the 
effects of poverty through the distribution of governmental funds in the form of delivery 
of products or services. His government sought to reverse this process by reducing poor 
people´s dependency on the receipt of these state sponsored benefits. Teixeira 
Magalhães believed that in order to produce long-lasting effects in the fight against 
poverty, his administration had to concentrate its efforts on increasing earnings in poor 
families. His plan was to raise income levels, along with the creation of better 
                                                          
121 “Law 8261/95”, January 6 1995, https://cm-campinas.jusbrasil.com.br/legislacao/337310/lei-8261-95 
 
122  PSDB claims to ownership of cash-transfer incentives center on their arguments that PSDB was the 
political party that instituted Bolsa Escola as a federal program. Moreover, its political leaders affirm that 
it was the regional version the cash-transfer measures deployed by PSDB in the municipality of Campinas 
the program that laid the foundational step to the national program. Conversely, PT alleges that it was the 
program deployed by Cristovam Buarque the architect for the subsequent cash-transfer programs at the 
national level. Also, PT affirms that the solidification of cash-benefits was obtained under its 




professional opportunities for the needy through access to education. This strategy 
would eventually free the poor from the dependency on the receipt of government´s 
services. 
The elevated number of children and adolescents that begged on the streets, sold 
products at traffic lights, and even engaged in illicit activities, made visible to the 
municipality of Campinas that actions had to be taken to provide poor youth better 
opportunities. The challenge for the municipality of Campinas concentrated on  
addressing two basic questions “Como fazer para combater o trabalho infantil, para 
impedir que o trabalho que essas crianças e adolescentes fosse vital para o orçamento 
dessas famílias? Como fazer para que essas crianças pudessem brincar e estudar?”. 123 
The acknowledgement that these children were out on the streets not because of their 
lack of interest to be educated but that they were victims of a system that constrained 
their ability to exercise their most elementary rights – the entitlement to be an active 
part of the Brazilian educational system, and the deterrent to work until the age of 16, 
was pivotal to the deployment of the Campinas cash-transfer program. 
One of the main differences between the Campinas and the Brasilia experiences 
was the fact that, in Campinas, families with children under the age of seven that 
qualified under the economic criteria were also eligible for the receipt of cash rewards.  
In Brasilia, only children between the ages of seven and fourteen who were enrolled in 
the public educational system were eligible to be participants in the program. By the 
adoption of more flexible entrance requirements, extending the benefits to families with 
children below seven and not attending school, the government of Campinas opted to 
                                                          
123 Arnaldo Machado De Souza and Ana Maria Medeiros Da Fonseca. “O Debate Sobre Renda Mínima a 
Experiência De Campinas.” São Paulo Em Perspectiva, vol. 4, no. 11 (1997): 28.  
 “What actions could be taken to fight child labor, to impede that their labor was vital for the budget of 




embrace the pursuit of improving nutritional levels as the main aspiration of its 
program.  
Families were required to prove residency in Campinas during the past two years 
and their household income could not exceed 140 reais. In case these families presented  
income above 140 reais, they also could be qualified for the program as long as their  
per capita income did not surpass thirty-five reais. The municipality of Campinas 
deployed its program in two distinct phases. In the first stage, efforts were concentrated 
on identifying families whose children lived on the streets and showed a deteriorating 
nutritional condition. The Secretary of Health was the responsible entity to detect the 
children that were eligible to be the first recipients of the program. The screened 
families were required to complete an application form – Ficha de Cadastramento – 
that compiled data on items such as their housing conditions, employment, income, 
educational level, and if they were participants in other state – sponsored social 
programs .124  In a subsequent phase initiated in May 1995, the scope of the program 
was widened and targeted families facing extreme poverty. By not only focusing on 
children who were living on the streets, or those who were in a debilitating nutritional 
state, the expansion of its breadth exponentially increased the number of beneficiaries, 













                                                          









Source: Author´s elaboration through data obtained from Fonseca and Montali (1996), 
O Programa de Renda Mínima de Campinas: Uma Estratégia de Combate à Pobreza 
Urbana 
 
Starting from 108 families in March, 1995, the municipality of Campinas had 
been able to reach 2687 families in July, 1996.  While these numbers represented a 
sizable population of the first targeted group – ninety percent of children living on the 
street, and ninety-two percent of the youth suffering malnutrition, the numbers 
regarding families living under extreme poverty were not as strong. It was estimated 
that during the first year of its implementation, PGRFM extended its benefits to thirteen 
percent of the population living under extreme poverty. As the scope of the program 
widened, the percentage of the eligible group that were covered by the PGRFM 
decreased considerably. With the sole adoption of socio-economic criteria, the universe 
of potential recipients surpassed the number of families that the government had 
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The municipality of Campinas and the Núcleo de Estudo de Pesquisas Públicas 
from the University of Campinas conducted studies to measure the first impacts of 
PGRFM.125 In terms of increasing income, the results were illuminating. Prior to the 
cash benefits, the median income of the covered families amounted to 50.06 reais with a 
per capita income of 10.85 reais. Subsequent to the implementation of the program, 
family income had increased to 162.97 reais while per capita figures grew more than 
three-fold, totaling 35.32 reais.  
Since the Campinas cash-transfer program did not determine how the cash 
benefits should be spent by the families, both studies attempted to investigate how the 
beneficiaries were administering their resources. Table 11 shows the figures found by 
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Table 11 Expenditure of Cash Benefits – Participants PGRFM 1995 
Items % 
Food, Cleaning, and Hygienic Material 45.8% 
Shoes and Clothing 10.4% 
Purchase of Furniture and home appliances 10.4% 
Payment of Overdue Bills 4.2% 
Payment of Water and Electricity Bills 8.3% 
School Supplies 8.3% 
Construction Material  8.3% 
Medicinal Products 2.1% 
Other Expenses 2.1% 
Total 100% 
Source: Fonseca and Montali (1996), O Programa de Renda Mínima de Campinas: Uma 
Estratégia de Combate à Pobreza Urbana. 
 
 
The preliminary results were illustrative regarding the assumption that the poor 
could not be entitled to receive money without restrictions on how they could spent this 
financial resource.126 As Table 10 demonstrates, almost half of the benefits were spent 
on items that aimed for the improvement of nutritional standards or better sanitation 
practices. Clothing and housing items were the other categories that accounted for a 
considerable portion of the cash assistance. The remaining amount of the resources were 
invested in other basic items that were essential for the improvement of their socio-
economic condition. On one hand, the government of Campinas could be pleased with 
                                                          
126 Hulme and others, Just Give Money, 73.  
David Hulme, Joseph Hanlon, and Armando Barrientos in their book Just Give Money to the Poor: The 
Development Revolution from the Global South, dispelled the allegations that the poor become lazy and 
dependent on the government when receiving any state financial help “The poor, find that the cash 




the results since they indicated an effective use of the cash benefits by its recipients. By 
spending on items such as food, hygienic products, and school supplies, the participants 
of the program were improving their standard of living and abandoning some of the 
undignified features of extreme poverty. On the other hand, these same numbers do not 
indicate any edifying evidence that the PGFRM participants will be able to engender 
new revenues and no longer need the cash benefit.  
The Campinas program had been designed with the goal of extending the 
benefits for one year. Nevertheless, in case the participants still had not been able to rise 
above poverty conditions at the end of that period, they were eligible to renew their 
participation for another year. The first assessment of the program by the government 
revealed that only twelve families could be discontinued from the program due to their 
rise in income levels. The profile of the benefited families, marked by low levels of 
education, lack of professional skills, and in many cases being single-parent households, 
all contributed to their short-term inability to overcome poverty. Moreover, these 
families faced a circumstance where the legal guardians encountered salient adversities 
to be inserted into the labor market given their limited professional expertise. 
Additionally, in many instances, the selected families included a single adult who was 
solely responsible for the upbringing of all the children in the home, and were unable to 
perform any labor activities outside of their household. 
The Campinas cash transfer program demonstrates that although it represented a 
progressive social policy, the idea of giving money to the poor was a concept that faced 
pronounced antagonism from some of the political establishment. Even twenty-three 
years after the first regional experiences with cash-benefits, the dispute on whether this 
type of program should stipulate the lifespan of its benefits, or if it should continually 
be granted as long as the participant families found themselves in poverty, it is still a 
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point of vigorous debate among the diverse political actors in Brazil. Brazilian president 
of the lower house, Rodrigo Maia argued that the current Brazilian cash – transfer 
program Bolsa Família, enslaves its recipients. In his statement, he asserts that a 
program that has no deadline to end its benefits, creates a counterproductive 
dependency on the government. In his words, a good social program “... inclui a pessoa 
e dá condições para que ela volte à sociedade e possa, com suas próprias pernas, 
conseguir um emprego. A cidadania é um emprego, a cidadania não é depender do 
Estado brasileiro”.127  His remark reflects the salient bias against the poor that persists 
in the political and societal realms of the Brazilian landscape. Maia´s “return to society” 
through employment implies that the poor are only an active agent of the Brazilian 
society when they are performing a remunerated activity. As long as the poor received 
any form of governmental assistance, a segment of the society would regard them a civil 
burden that had to be financed by the working class.  
Despite some resistance from a sector of the political class, the pioneer 
Campinas and Brasilia´s experiences expanded throughout other municipalities in Brazil 
that mirrored their programs on these two innovative endeavors. According to the 
assessment of the impact of cash-transfer programs on child labor and school 
attendance, conducted by Cardoso, Portela and Souza (2009), in the beginning of 1999 
there were sixty-one cash-transfer programs deployed in Brazil, distributed over 
different states.128 The encouraging results that the local experiences yielded were 
pivotal to the subsequent scale up of the program to the federal level. In Campinas it 
                                                          
127 Henrique Gomes Batista, “Maia Afirma Que Bolsa Família 'Escraviza' as Pessoas.” O Globo, O 
Globo, 17 Jan. 2018, oglobo.globo.com/brasil/maia-afirma-que-bolsa-familia-escraviza-as-pessoas-
22296779.  
 “…enables the participant to return to society, and be capable through her own efforts, to get a job. 
Exercising citizenship consists on having a job instead of being dependent on the government”. Author´s 
translation 
128 Eliana Cardoso and André Portela F. De Souza. “The Impact of Cash Transfers on Child Labor and 




was estimated that by the end of Buarque´s administration, eighty percent of the eligible 
population was being covered by Bolsa Escola. With less than one percent of Brasilia´s 
total budget, the Federal District had been able to yield substantial results in the increase 
of school attendance and reduction of child labor. These numbers surely would not go 
unnoticed by the federal government that still struggled to develop effective social 
policies to fight poverty. 
4.5 -From Regional to Federal – Bolsa Escola 
The promising preliminary results obtained with the regional cash-transfer 
experiences attracted the attention of the federal government. The Campinas and 
Brasilia programs had been replicated in municipalities in different states where local 
authorities sought alternatives to finance their programs. In a April 2000 meeting with 
the governor of the state of Mato Grosso. Cardoso narrated an episode when he was 
asked to pardon the state´s debt with the federal government in exchange for subsidies 
to finance their regional Bolsa Escola program. In his diary Cardoso pointed out that, 
although he considered that the Union should provide financial assistance to the 
regional governments to deploy their Bolsa Escola programs, this monetary aid should 
not be associated with the state´s debt to the Union.129 In the same year, Cardoso also 
logged in his diary a meeting with the governor of the state of Goiás, where he 
presented the state´s version of a cash transfer program. Cardoso remarked that this 
program had been inspired by Bolsa Escola and he was impressed by how it appeared to 
be superior in comparison to other federal programs of his government.130 These two 
                                                          
129 Cardoso, Diaries Vol. III, 533. 
Entry from 28 april, 2000 “Eles sabem que continuamos  subsidiando os estados. Agora o Bolsa Escola é 
uma coisa importante, e o governo, por outro caminho, deve dar recursos à Bolsa Escola, mas não 
trocando pela dívida, até porque a Bolsa Escola gasta muito pouco em comparação ao tamanho da dívida”  
 
130 Ibid, 602. 
“O governador de Goiás mostrou, como havia prometido, o programa que eles têm de Bolsa Cidadã (do 
qual resultou o Bolsa Escola), no fundo um tipo de renda mínima que me parece bastante razoável, e 
melhor do que muitos programas que fazemos sem resultados maiores”. 
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events illustrate how the thriving achievements obtained by regional experiences with 
cash transfer programs pressured the Federal Government to play a more prominent role 
in providing monetary assistance to the poor. 
Another important strength of cash-transfer programs, especially for developing 
nations is how effective they are to reduce poverty considering the volume of resources 
employed by the government. In Brazil, presidents have little autonomy over the federal 
budget since the largest bulk of governmental expenditure is already destined to meet 
governmental spending requirements established in the Constitution, along with 
payments of the public debt. Fernando Henrique Cardoso was aware that a piece of 
legislation enacted in his own government, Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal, compelled 
him to create a new source of revenue to fund a federal cash-transfer program. 
Besides all internal problems and the precarious social structure that permeated 
the Brazilian government, Cardoso had to deal with an external economic agent that 
posed more obstacles to expanding social investment. In November of 1998, Cardoso, 
had to resort to the International Monetary Fund to borrow thirty billion dollars in 
pursuance of the sustainability of his economic plan that was being seriously affected by 
the Russian crisis that erupted that same year. As part of its conditionality, the IMF 
imposed on Brazil the generation of a primary surplus of three percent. 131 The impact 
                                                          
 
131 In order to generate a primary surplus, the government´s total revenues need to be higher than its 
spending. Interests paid on governmental debts are excluded from this calculation. Gesner Oliveira and 
Frederico Turolla analyze the economic policies during the second term of Cardoso and the impact of the 
pursuit of primary surplus´ goals on the achievement of economic growth and levels of investment. 
Oliveira, Gesner, and Frederico Turolla. "Política Econômica Do Segundo Governo FHC: Mudança Em 
Condições Adversas." Tempo Social 15, no. 2 (2003): 195-217. 
In addition to the financial pressure exerted by the IMF, Fernando Henrique Cardoso faced another 
budgetary restriction that was created by his own government. On May 4, 2000, Cardoso approved a 
piece of legislation called Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal. This piece of legislation established that all 
political unities, the Union, the states, the federal district, and the municipalities were obliged to attach 
their expenditure to their capacity of raising revenues. One of the main goals of this complementary law 
was to avoid lame duck governments to undergo large projects in order to “write a legacy” for their 




of the IMF´s economic policies on developing nations has generated substantial 
academic literature and it will not be investigated in this research project.132 
Notwithstanding, it is important to note the standpoint of current Brazilian Central 
Bank´s president, Illan Goldfajn. In an article published in 2003, he argues that the 
IMF´s restricted economic policies forced the Brazilian government to be more 
effective in the management of its public accounts, and that conditionality yielded 
Brazil some positive gains. 133  
That rationale seems to fit the case of the Federal government regarding the 
deployment of cash – transfer programs. Cardoso related in his diary how the 
conditionality of the IMF of running a primary surplus of three percent constrained the 
ability of the government to invest in programs designed to fight poverty. 
Notwithstanding, Cardoso observed that his government was investing in a wide range 
                                                          
Gary Reich, "Executive Decree Authority in Brazil: How Reactive Legislators Influence 
Policy." Legislative Studies Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2002): 5-31 explains how Brazilian presidents 
extensively use presidential decree orders. This instrument provided FHC the viability of implementing a 
new social policy without Congress´s preapproval, although Brazilian legislators hold the autonomy to 
amend executive decrees. 
 
132 To name a few of these studies:  
Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (Penguin Books 2002) 
by the Nobel prize recipient and former senior vice-president and chief economist for the World Bank 
Joseph Stiglitz exposes the failure of the IMF´s practices to ensure economic prosperity in developing 
nations.  
For works focused on specific cases see  
Paul Blustein, And The Money Rolling In (and Out): Wall Street, the IMF, and the Bankrupting of 
Argentina (Public Affarirs 2006) 
Blustein narrates the events that led to the collapse of the Argentinian economy.  
See also  
Benjamin Kohl and Linda C. Farthing,Impasse in Bolivia: Neoliberal Hegemony and Popular Resistance 
(Zed Books 2006) 
They describe how neoliberal reforms led to a popular uprising that resulted in the dismissal of IMF´s 
economic prescriptions.  
 
133 Illan Goldfajn, “Conference on Globalization and IMF.” Club De Madrid, (2003): 22.  
Although Goldjan´s research points out weaknesses on the IMF´s economic strategy, it also takes into 
consideration positive aspects of the Brazilian negotiation with the entity “On the political side, the IMF 
agreement provided the need to coordinate on basic economic principles – fiscal responsibility, monetary 




of different social programs. In his opinion, the fragmented social agenda of his 
government that deployed many programs without a common goal was causing his 
government to lose focus. The IMF´s economic goals, forced the Brazilian government 
to be overly efficacious in the allocation of its investments. With fewer financial 
resources available, Cardoso´s administration was pressured to attain a new level of 
competence and effectiveness. Edward Amadeo who was at the time replacing Pedro 
Malan as the Minister of Finance, approached Cardoso and proposed the idea that the 
government should concentrate its efforts on fighting poverty through the enhancement 
of the Bolsa Escola program. Cardoso demonstrated his concordance with Amadeo and 
expressed his perception that a program that implied a direct transference of income 
could be the most compelling way to fight poverty. 134 
On February 13, 2001, through the enactment of the provisional measure 2.140, 
Cardoso instituted Bolsa Escola as a federal program, extending its benefits to the entire 
Brazilian population. On the previous day of the formalization of the Federal Bolsa 
Escola, Cardoso gave a speech in the city of Aguas Lindas in the state of Goiás where 
he stressed the significance of scaling the program to the federal level. Although 
Cardoso in his diaries attributes the creation of Bolsa Escola to the program deployed 
by Cristovam Buarque in Brasilia, in this speech Cardoso extoled the figure of  
Campinas´s former mayor José Roberto Magalhães Teixeira, who in his speech was 
given the prominent role of the architect of the program.135 Cardoso and Magalhães 
belonged to the same political party, PSDB, while Cristovam Buarque, at the moment of 
                                                          
134 Cardoso, Vol III, 622. 
“No fim dia, Edward Amadeo, que está substituindo Malan no Ministério da Fazenda, disse, com razão, 
que precisamos fazer uma coisa nova: nos concentrar na Bolsa Escola, distribuirmos mais Bolsas Escolas, 
que é uma distribuição direta de renda.”  
135 José Roberto Teixeira Magalhães passed way in 1996, a year after the launch of the Campinas´s 




the implementation of the Bolsa Escola in Brasilia, was affiliated to Cardoso´s rival 
political party, PT. The fact that the deployment of cash-transfer programs had proven 
to be an effective strategy to fight poverty, gave rise to an intensive dispute regarding 
the fatherhood of the program. Cardoso was aware of the political gains that could be 
obtained by being recognized as the maker of Bolsa Escola in the presidential elections 
that would be held in the following year. 136 In April of the same year, Cardoso named 
the law that instituted Bolsa Escola, Lei Magalhães Teixeira, with the clear intention of 
establishing that his political party was the creator of cash-transfer initiatives in Brazil. 
In the same speech, Cardoso reiterated that the focus of the program was the 
poorest segment of the Brazilian society “O Brasil cansou de ver recursos em nome dos 
pobres pararem naqueles que não são os mais pobres”.137 He stressed the responsibility 
of the community and the local authorities to ensure that the resources were being 
applied to the well-being of the proper group. Cardoso asserted that the government´s 
preliminary estimates bespoke that approximately nine million children would be 
eligible to Bolsa Escola. Cardoso accentuated how Bolsa Escola tackled two of the 
main hurdles that pervaded his country “no Brasil nada é mais importante que duas 
coisas que estão sendo combinadas aqui: educação e aumento de renda. Este é o Brasil 
do futuro, com melhor educação e maior renda”. 138 Cardoso´s statement was a 
                                                          
136 The presidential election of 2002 was a political battle between Cardoso´s political party, represented 
by former Minister of Health José Serra, and Cardoso´s old political rival Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva, the 
leader of PT and the politician who ruled Brazil for two presidential terms. 
 
137 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, “Discurso Cardoso- Bolsa Escola Federal.” 
Biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br, www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/fernando-
henrique-cardoso/discursos/2o-mandato/2001/13.pdf/view, p. 87. 
Brazil is tired of witnessing resources that were intended to aid the poor being directed to those who do 
not belong to the lowest stratum of the society”. Author´s translation. 
 
138 Cardoso, Discurso Bolsa Federal, 88. 
 “…in Brazil nothing is more important than the two things that are being combined here: education and 





reassertion of the Buarque´s statement in 1995 that recognized that there was a clear 
correlation between being extremely poor and not attending the educational system.  
The conceptual foundation of the local and the national variation of Bolsa 
Escola remained identical. The federal version of the program maintained the focus on 
keeping poor children in school, as Buarque had envisioned in his regional program. 
However, at the operational level, the federal government had to deploy adjustments in 
order to match the scope for the program with the availability of resources attainable by 
the Union. An assessment undertaken by Cardoso´s cabinet established the proper target 
group and the amount of the benefit given to each qualified family. One of the changes 
implemented by the national government was the widening of the age bracket of the 
eligible recipients. While the regional version of Bolsa Escola covered children 7-14, 
the national variant extended the eligibility to ages 6-15. Families with children of the 
stipulated age had to attend the public educational system and hold attendance records 
of at least eighty-five percent. Besides, the age requirement, families that pursued the 
aid of Bolsa Escola had to fit into financial prerequisites established by the government. 
As for the financial criterion, per capita income of the beneficiaries could not be 
superior to ninety reais, which was equivalent to half-monthly minimum salary. Taking 
into consideration the age and financial criteria, the preliminary evaluation by the 
federal government estimated that the program would reach out approximately nine 
million children 139 
                                                          
139 A posterior report elaborated in March, 2003, by the Ministry of Education, set the goal of assisting 
5,8 million  families, reaching out 11 million children between the ages 6 -15 during the years of 2001-
2002.  
Through the achievement of these numbers, the government estimated that one out of every three children 
attending the educational system would be assisted through Bolsa Escola. (Minister of Education 2001). 






It is important to note that although the Federal Bolsa Escola, widened the target 
group by extending the age bracket of eligible children, the resources received by each 
recipient was diminished once the program was scaled to the national level. While, 
Brasilia´s program granted one minimum-salary to each family, the federal version 
stipulated the maximum amount that an eligible family could be granted was forty-five 
reais. The upper limit of the cash - benefit, entailed the reward of fifteen reais per child, 
with a cap of three children per family. 140 At the time of the deployment of the Federal 
Bolsa Escola, the minimum salary in Brazil was one-hundred and eighty dollars. Taking 
into consideration these figures, the benefit granted to each children was equivalent to 
8.3% of the value of the minimum salary, while families composed of three or more 
children would receive 25% of a minimum salary. A positive aspect of the federal 
program was that, unlike its regional variants, the national arrangement did not stipulate 
a time limit to the end of the benefits. The loss of eligibility would derive from either 
the incompatibility with the age bracket or non-compliance to the minimum school 
attendance requirements.  
As seen in the chapter on Fernando Collor de Mello, one of the main flaws of the 
structure designed to carry out governmental social policies was the creation of local 
committees. In many instances, these entities would receive resources from the 
government and be in charge of distributing public assistance in the form of food 
baskets, medicine, or other services, to the population within their areas of influence. 
This strategy enabled the government to strengthen its local political alliances, and use 
public aid for electoral purposes. Furthermore, this arrangement led to a position where 
leakage of resources was considerably higher, resulting in a poor allocation of the 
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government resources. To avert this scenario the federal government determined that 
Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF), would centralize all responsibilities regarding the 
distribution of the cash-benefits. By appointing CEF as the financial hub for Bolsa 
Escola the federal government capitalized on the existing structure of the banking 
institution and utilized CEF´s extensive territorial presence and expertise to perform the 
delivery of cash-benefits.  
Another important prerogative of the Federal Bolsa Escola was that women were 
assigned as the primary receivers of the financial assistance. Studies on cash-transfer 
programs have shown how the strategy of appointing women as the primary receptors of 
cash-benefits result in the optimal usage of the resources “Evidence from countries as 
varied as Brazil, China, India, South Africa, and the United Kingdom shows that when 
women control more household income—either through their own earnings or through 
cash transfers—children benefit as a result of more spending on food and education” .141 
Given the focus of Bolsa Escola on improving educational levels among the youth, 
enabling women to manage the extra revenue proved to be an ingenious arrangement. 
Another indirect ramification of the strategy of appointing women as the primary 
recipients was that it might contribute to improve gender equality, since women are 
empowered through the increase of household income under their care. 142 
The characteristics mentioned above were some of the main attributes of Bolsa 
Escola once it was elevated to a national social program. This study will not delve into 
measuring and evaluating the impacts of such program on alleviating poverty, an 
                                                          
141 Ana Revenga, and Shudhir Shetty. “Empowering Women Is Smart Economics.” Finance and 
Development (March 2012): 40. 
 
142 For a study on the impacts of cash transfers on women´s empowerment see  
Kate Ambler and Alan De Brauw “The Impacts of Cash Transfer on Women´s Empowerment: Learning 




endeavor much more suitable for a scholar equipped with a grounded knowledge of 
quantitative research methods. Additionally, in order to assess the effects of the federal 
Bolsa Escola and its renamed and rebranded version Bolsa Familia, would require an 
extension of the end of the timeframe proposed by this study, the year of 2001. The 
focus of this research is to trace the origins of the convergence point, when the fight for 
poverty in Brazil aligned the universalization of free primary education and healthcare 
jointly with a federal cash-transfer program (Bolsa Escola). The next chapter reviews 
the findings of this research project and attempts to highlight the events that seem to 



















5 - Final Conclusions: 
A logical starting point to elaborate a list of the most significant developments 
that occurred in Brazil during 1988 -2001, and that culminated in the concept of giving 
money to the poor is the promulgation of a new Constitution in 1988. Despite the fact 
that when first elaborated, amidst its extensive list of articles there is not a single 
predisposition that establishes the entitlement of cash-benefits from the Brazilian 
government to any sector of its citizens, the Constitution was indirectly responsible for 
the model of cash-transfer program that was crafted in Brazil. The feasibility of 
conditioning the receipt of cash incentives on compliance with requirements in the areas 
of education and health would not be viable had these same services not been provided 
at no cost by the government. The universalization of primary education and healthcare 
was established in the Constitution of 1988. This was the fundamental instrument that 
enabled Brazilian policy makers to design a plan that would, besides fight against 
poverty directly through cash assistance, also counter other structural hurdles originated 
through the lack of income – the inability of poor children to be educated and the 
absence of proper medical care. This is without any doubts the most celebrated event for 
the objectives of this study that occurred in the government of José Sarney. However, 
the conception of a new Constitution was the result of a social clamor for a new 
document that would be representative of the era post-military dictatorship, rather than 
an initiative conducted by his government. The observations raised in the analysis of the 
social policies deployed in his period in the Brazilian presidency signaled that Brazil 
had yet to detach itself from the idea that poverty is erased from society through the 
attainment of economic growth, a salient rationale adopted by the military regime. Not 
even the resounding evidence that the military dictatorship resulted in lower income for 
the lower classes seemed sufficient to depart from the idea of associating economic 
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growth with reduction of poverty. Sarney´s government was a manifestation of the 
lingering legacy of the military rule. Furthermore, the examination of his government 
exposes the inefficacious allocation of resources employed in social programs. The 
greatest portion of social government spending did not target the poorest segment as the 
examination of state expenditures on the areas of education and health made evident.  
Fernando Collor de Mello´s inaugural speech kindled hopes that the recognition 
that economic growth was not sufficient to fight against poverty had finally reached the 
highest governmental offices. However, his first presidential speech marked the tone for 
a series of deceptions and setbacks that permeated his short period as the first 
democratically elected president post-military dictatorship. His veto of twenty-five 
items of the Lei Orgânica da Saúde, the piece of legislation that constituted the 
backbone of the financial structure of the Sistema Único de Saúde is illustrative of his 
disregard for a progressive social agenda. Perhaps even more detrimental than his lack 
of commitment for the betterment of the Brazilian social structure was the looting of 
public funds destined for social programs promoted by his administration. The epitome 
of his corruptive practices in the social sphere was the use of Legião Brasileira de 
Assistência under the leadership of his wife.  
The only development under Collor´s administration that seems to have 
contributed to the design of cash-transfer schemes does not have any direct relation with 
his government. In 1991, opposing political party Partido dos Trabalhadores, and a 
number of economists, discussed an economic scheme that contemplated the notion of 
granting a minimum income to every Brazilian citizen. Although this author has not 
been able to collect more substantial data to assess the exact influence of Suplicy’s 
advocacy for state payments through cash benefits in the formulation of Bolsa Escola. 
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Nonetheless, some reference to the Suplicy’s campaign for a universal minimum 
income is amply present amidst the studies on cash-transfer programs in Brazil. 
If Fernando Collor´s government accounted for a setback in the social, political, 
and economic spheres, leaving no traces of any legacy for the deployment of cash-
transfer programs, it was during the government of his successor, Itamar Franco, that 
Brasil would take the first concrete steps towards the concept of giving money to the 
poor. The enactment of Lei Orgânica de Assistência Social, a legal predisposition that 
had been vetoed by Collor, provided the regulatory framework to put into practice the 
social provisions of the 1988 Constitution. It was under the Lei Orgânica de Assistência 
Social that Brazil started moving towards the disentanglement of social security and 
social assistance. As discussed previously, one of the main features of the Brazilian 
social protection system was its defective system that did not cover the segment of 
population that was either unemployed or belonged to the informal labor apparatus 
without any social security shelter. The Beneficio de Prestação Continuada guaranteed 
one monthly minimum-salary to any citizen with disabilities and elderly people that fit 
the age and financial criteria regardless their employment situation. Although the scope 
of this program was limited in comparison to the posterior cash-transfer programs, it 
can be envisaged as a stepping-stone to the subsequent developments. Furthermore, by 
adopting the financial requirement of families with income below one-quarter of the 
minimum monthly-salary, the government ensured that its resources were being directed 
to the extremely poor. 
Although its intention was very likely to divide responsibility with civil society, 
the strategy adopted by Franco to share social accountability, more specifically the 
issues of poverty and inequality with the population, might have contributed to 
galvanize support for the development of social policies targeted to the poorest. The 
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wide civil engagement gathered by the joint actions between the federal government and 
Ação da Cidadania, led by Betinho, in the two years preceding the first regional cash-
transfer programs 1993-1994, might have been crucial to raise consciousness among 
politicians and civil society to the severity of the issues of poverty and inequality in 
Brazil. The deployment of Plano do Combate a Fome e a Miséria, a governmental 
scheme headed by a member of the civil society, Betinho, along with the creation of 
Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar, were the two pillars of the campaign for 
government and civil society coalescing into one single instrument to fight poverty. 
Before moving to an examination of the legacy of Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
in the deployment of cash-transfer programs in Brazil it is imperative to stress the 
foundational base of his federal Bolsa Escola, its regional versions from Brasilia and 
Campinas. These two regional programs were the architects of the concept of rewarding 
poor families with cash incentives, provided that, they followed conditionalities in the 
areas of education and healthcare. In Brasilia, Cristovam Buarque concluded that poor 
children did not go to school because their families relied on their labor for subsistence. 
He understood that the government’s responsibility was to take actions to provide these 
children an opportunity to study. Buarque’s inferences, although seemingly elementary, 
laid the foundational ground for the posterior developments of cash-transfer programs. 
A similar acknowledgement provided the conceptual framework for the social policies 
focusing on the poorest deployed in Campinas. The two basic questions that directed all 
efforts in the formulation of effective social policing were straightforward – how to 
impede child labor and what could be done to allow poor children to exercise their 
rights to play and study? The time lapse of six years between the first cash-transfer 
policies until the adoption of the same strategy scheme by the federal government put 
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forward a series of other regional initiatives that mirrored the Brasilia and Campinas 
experiences. 
As for the ongoing political debate whether the federal Bolsa Escola was 
modeled after the Campinas or the Brasilia’s program, the diaries of president Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso provide solid evidence that Buarque’s plan was the one that exerted 
more influence on the federal government.  Another fact that corroborates the higher 
influence of Buarque’s program on the federal Bolsa Escola, is the overt demonstration 
that once the program was scaled to the federal level it kept the name of the Brasilia’s 
scheme. Though this debate should be deemed of secondary relevance to the literature 
of cash-transfer endeavors, the political struggle to determine the fatherhood of the idea 
of giving money to the poor suggests the positive results stemming from this policy. 
The fact that the two political parties, PT and PSDB, that claim paternity of Bolsa 
Escola have opposing political ideologies stresses the galvanized support obtained by 
this initiative. PT is notoriously a political organization identified with the left wing, 
while political specialists credit PSDB as a right-centrist political party.  
Prior to adopting Bolsa Escola as an integral part of its social agenda, Cardoso´s 
plan to eradicate child labor (PETI), also promoted the idea of awarding money to 
children that attended school. Perhaps the main dissimilarities of this program and Bolsa 
Escola were its scope and operational framework. PETI had to rely on a convoluted 
network where state authorities first had to locate working children and then proceed 
with the state bureaucracy to process the benefits to their families. On the other hand, 
Bolsa Escola simplified this process and extended its coverage to all children that fit the 
financial and age criteria, regardless of their employment situation. Perhaps that is one 
of the reasons that Bolsa Escola yielded solid and sustainable positive results. At the 
same time that it enlarged the scope of programs such as PETI, its simpler requirements 
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enabled the government to focus on the poorest with lower operational costs. The 
eventual incorporation of PETI into Bolsa Família demonstrates that this program 
followed the same precepts and was relevant to the subsequent and more elaborated 
version of cash-transfer scheme.  
One of the main strengths of cash-transfer programs grounded on financial 
requirements is their effective targeting for the poorest and the positive return on 
investment ratio. Return here is being measured as the number of people being raised 
above poverty levels through state payments. The strict fiscal policies imposed by the 
International Monetary Fund, might have been influential to the adoption of cash-
transfer initiatives by the federal government. Drawing on Cardoso´s accounts, he states 
clearly how the conditionality of running a primary surplus of three percent limited the 
ability of his government to expand social investment to combat poverty. His diaries 
also highlight his recognition that programs of redistribution of income might represent 
the solution to increase the efficiency of the scarce resources applied in social programs. 
The pressure of dealing with an external agent, monitoring public accounts and setting 
economic goals and policies, might have indirectly affected Cardoso’s decision to resort 
to cash-transfer programs as a method to deal with the conundrums of poverty and 
income inequality.  
 This academic research attempted to rely on the interpretation of past events, 
along with the academic literature that surrounds the universe of cash-transfer schemes, 
to be able to draw inferences about origins of the concept of giving money to the poor in 
Brazil. The primary goal of this academic study was to identify the main events, or 
social policies, occurring in the years of 1988-2001 that have contributed to the 
deployment of a federal cash-transfer initiative in Brazilian territory. I hope that 
scholars interested in this area, as well as policy makers will grasp the importance of 
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how cash-transfer programs were not a concept that emerged in Brazil overnight, but a 
development that happen over a span of many years. The successful case of Brazil 
became a product exported to a wide range of developing nations. Indeed, for those who 
believe that governments have to take more responsibility for their poor population, it is 
encouraging to see that the Brazilian and Mexican experiences have been inspirational 
to other nations that face the conundrum of high levels of poverty. However, this study 
hopes to shed light on the mechanisms and ideas that enabled the deployment of such 
program, so that, policy makers and scholars partaking in the deployment of cash-
transfer initiatives in other countries can draw from the Brazilian experience, and adapt 
such programs to their particular conjuncture. Of no lesser importance, this historical 
account of the development of cash-transfer programs in Brazil, points out the influence 
of small, regional enterprises. As shown in this study, the regional experiences of 
Brasilia and Campinas paved the way for the federal program. Perhaps, here lies a 
valuable lesson for political leaders. An inward look at their local political unities might 
reveal to them successful actions that can be scaled to the federal level. This author 
hopes that this essay will contribute for further discussions of the initiatives to fight 
poverty and engage historians to conduct studies on the revolutionary idea of giving 
money to the poor, and endeavor that has been mostly concentrated on the areas of 
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